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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1986, the European Community's twelve member states revived the
long moribund dream of creating a single market, pledging to finalize its
design by January 1, 1993.' The apparent premise of the project was
economically liberal: only an integrated market encompassing over 320
million people could offer EC firms the economies of scale needed to reduce
inefficiencies and compete effectively with Japanese and American firms.
Experts commissioned by the European Community offered various predic-
tions of the expected benefits from such a market. The most influential of
these predictions, the Cecchini report of 1988, predicted savings of between
174 million and 258 million ECU, of which one-third to one-half would come
from restructuring and rationalizing inefficient firms.2
Since mergers and acquisitions - "concentrations," in European parlance
- play a key role in industrial restructuring, it was essential for the Twelve
to agree on some system to police interstate mergers. The Council of
Ministers, which is the chief policy-making body of the Community and
consists of cabinet-level representatives from all twelve states, reached such
an agreement in the form of a common merger control regulation, announced
with great fanfare on December 21, 1989.' EC Competition Commissioner
Leon Brittan hailed the agreement as a "historic breakthrough in the creation
of a single European market. "I
The Regulation gives the Commission the authority to approve or reject
all mergers of a "Community dimension," defined as mergers whose
participants have an aggregate worldwide turnover' of more than five billion
ECU, with at least two participants having a Community-wide turnover of 250
million ECU each. 6 The parties to any such merger must pre-notify the
Commission, which must reject or approve the proposed merger based on
whether it would "create or strengthen a dominant position as a result of
which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common
market or in a substantial part of it . . . ."' Rejection or approval hinges on
factors such as the structure of the market, the firms' economic and financial
power, potential competition, barriers to entry, and the extent to which the
1. Single European Act of February 17, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 7 (effective July 1, 1987).
2. PAOLO CECCHINI, THE EUROPEAN CHALLENGE, 1992: THE BENEFITS OF A SINGLE MARKET
84 (John Robinson trans., 1988). The report, commissioned by the European Commission, was authored
by a distinguished group of European academics, businessmen, and officials led by Cecchini. The ECU,
the unit of value used throughout the report and in most EC documents, represents a basket of EC
currencies. Its value was 1 ECU = $1.217 in mid-March, 1988. Id. at 107.
3. Council Regulation 89/4064 on the Control of Concentration Between Undertakings, 1990 J.0.
(L 257) 14 [hereinafter 1989 Regulation].
4. Lucy Kellaway, EC Ministers Hand Brussels the Power to Vet Large Mergers, FIN. TIMEs, Dec.
22, 1989, at 2.
5. Aggregate turnover is defined in the Regulation as amounts derived from the sales of products
and the provision of services, after deducting sales rebates and value added tax. 1989 Regulation, supra
note 3, art. 5(1).
6. Id. art. 1.
7. Id. pmbl.
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proposed merger might contribute to "the development of technical and
economic progress"' in the European Community.
The Regulation followed sixteen years of sputtering negotiations that began
in 1973 when the Commission, the central administrative body of the
European Community, first proposed a merger text to the Council.9 In fact,
Commission jockeying for competency over concentrations dates back to
1966, when the Commission circulated a legal opinion on the subject.' ° Stop-
and-go Council talks on merger control throughout the 1970s and 1980s
parallelled a series of European Court of Justice decisions from the 1973
ruling in Continental Can" to the 1987 decision in BAT & RJ Reynolds, 2
in which the Court gingerly sought to interpret the Treaty in a light most
favorable to the expansion of the Commission's competencies over concentra-
tions.
The merger text that the Council finally adopted in 1989 was ambiguous
and limited in scope. The text failed to resolve key disputes which had
plagued the decades of negotiations, such as the demarcation of Community
and national jurisdiction, the criteria for evaluating mergers, and the
procedures the Commission was to follow in undertaking evaluation. 3
Moreover, the document preserved in the hands of member states as much
authority as it placed in the Commission. Overall, the 1989 Regulation
resisted as much as it acknowledged any underlying "spirit" or "objectives"
of the Treaty of Rome, to which the European Court had appealed in
Continental Can. 4
This article will sketch the thirty-year history of Commission politicking,
court adjudicating, interest-group lobbying, and member state negotiating that
preceded the adoption of the merger regulation. Its discussion will focus
alternatively on the Commission, the European Court of Justice, and the
national bureaucracies of the major players. The article explains how states
translated divergent interests into the language of consensus, and argues that
the process of compromise reveals the shallowness of the common purpose
rhetoric that surrounded the efforts to adopt a single merger control policy.
By uncovering the roles and interests of the diverse national and institutional
parties, this article hopes to reveal the disarray behind the apparent consensus
on the new regulation.
Several commentators discussing the EC's mid-1980s "relaunch" have
stressed apparent agreement among the Twelve on the virtues of deregulatory
economics and a seeming consensus on the benefits of open markets and
competition. 5 However, the inability of the EC member states to reach
8. Id. art. 2.
9. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
11. Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co. v. Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 215.
12. British Am. Tobacco Co. & RI Reynolds v. Commission, 1987 E.C.R. 4487.
13. See infra notes 343-390 and accompanying text.
14. Continental Can, 1973 E.C.R. at 243.
15. See, e.g., David R. Cameron, The 1992 Initiative: Causes & Consequences, in EuRo-PoLrrics
23, 26 (Albert M. Sbragia ed., 1992); Robert 0. Keohane & Stanley Hoffmann, Institutional Change
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agreement on anything but the outermost perimeter of the sphere of merger
control suggests otherwise. Antitrust policy is a realm in which the rhetoric
of neutral economic principles can mask strategic decisions about the
distribution of property, and the merger control regulation reveals how
divergent the member states' decisions are. Despite the popular perception that
each of the Twelve is devoted to a specific economic philosophy, and despite
each government's self-proclaimed dedication to a European Community
relaunch predicated on open markets and common economic goals, these
sentiments are not yet strong enough to overcome the use of merger control
as a national tool of economic intervention. Supranationalism has yet to
replace realpolitik. The story of the 1989 Regulation is one of twelve states'
struggle to keep the merger control tool from Brussels, mixed with nominal
devotion to the virtue of a common policy. As such, the evolution of
Community merger control supports the thesis that the Community's member
states, rather than the Community's institutions, remain the ultimate charters
of the Community's future. 16 Interstate bargaining driven by national
interest, rather than consensus building driven by commonly-perceived shared
interests, continues to characterize the Community's development.
II. ROOTS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COMPETITION LAW
A. The Treaty of Rome
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community (Treaty of Rome)17 are the twin bases of the European Commu-
nity's authority over competition. 8 Article 85 bans "any agreements between
enterprises, and decisions by associations of enterprises and any concerted
practices which are likely to affect trade between the Member States and
which have as their object or result the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the Common Market." 9 Article 86 states that "[t]o the
extent to which trade between any Member States may be affected thereby,
action by one or more enterprises to take improper advantage of a dominant
position within the Common Market, or within a substantial part of it shall be
deemed to be incompatible with the Common Market and shall hereby be
prohibited."20 Both articles enumerate actions that they control or prohibit,
but the use of the phrase "in particular" in both cases suggests that the lists
in Europe in the 1980s, in TnE NEW EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 1, 23, 24 (Robert 0. Keohane & Stanley
Hoffmann eds., 1990). Analysts have attributed this convergence of views to the election of center-right
governments in several member states in the late 1970s and early 1980s and to France's 1983
abandonment of the socialist experiment launched by President Mitterrand in the early 1980s. See, e.g.,
Cameron, supra, at 56-59.
16. For one authority who advances this theory, see Institutional Change, supra note 15, at 17.
17. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11
[hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
18. D.G. GOYDER, EEC COMPErrION LAW 14 (1988).
19. Treaty of Rome, supra note 17, art. 85.
20. Id. art. 86.
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are not meant to be exclusive. 2' These provisions seem to reflect a coherent
resolve to establish a free market with competition moderately policed by the
Commission. Their wording, however, reveals a series of unresolved
questions of both substance and procedure.
One central substantive issue concerns whether the Community's antitrust
policy should be based solely on the goal of maintaining perfectly competitive
markets - in which case, the Commission should evaluate potentially anti-
competitive actions solely for their effects on competition - or whether,
instead, the policy should be based on a mixture of competition and industrial
policy criteria. Industrial policy encompasses a wide range of government
management of industrial activity, from long-term planning and government
intervention in industrial behavior and restructuring, to more subtle govern-
ment sponsored encouragement of particular industrial actions. The objectives
of industrial policy are also wide-ranging, encompassing social, regional, and
employment goals, as well as the desire to channel investment into particular
sectors and technologies. Industrial policy appears in Article 85(3), which
exempts from regulation any anti-competitive agreement that "contribute[s] to
the improvement of the production or distribution of goods or to the
promotion of technical or economic progress while reserving to users an
equitable share in the profit resulting therefrom . *..."22 Article 86, on the
other hand, seems to be more of a pure competition text, but its strictness is
tempered by the fact that it prohibits only those anti-competitive activities that
the Commission can prove constitute an abuse of a dominant position.'
Another substantive question concerns the utility of banning only abuse of
pre-existing dominant positions rather than the creation of dominance itself.
Some analysts argue that by adopting this dichotomy, the Treaty of Rome's
drafters introduced a "double standard" into Community competition law with
stricter prohibitions against cartelization than against concentration.24 Given
the variety of economic and political motives for encouraging concentra-
tion,' this double standard could have a profound impact on the extent of
concentration in the European Community.
The main procedural debate raised by Articles 85 and 86 concerns which
institution should decide what constitutes an abuse under Article 86 or what
agreements qualify for an exemption under Article 85(3).26 Article 155
21. GOYDER, supra note 18, at 25-27.
22. Treaty of Rome, supra note 17, art. 85(3).
23. GOYDER, supra note 18, at 26-27. Advocate-General Roemer advanced this interpretation of
Article 86 in Continental Can. See infra notes 58 and 60-62 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g. PIERRE Bos ET AL., CONCENTRATION CONTROL IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 4-5,
10-13 (1992).
25. Economic motives include a perceived need to form industrial giants large enough to compete
with U.S. and Japanese firms. DENNIS SWANN, THE ECONOMICS OF THE COMMON MARKET 160 (2d
ed. 1970). Political motives include the wish to encourage integration of the economies of EC members.
Id. at 55.
26. The European Community is composed of four main institutions: the Council of Ministers, the
Commission, the Court of Justice, and the Parliament.
(1) Representatives of each member state sit on the Council, which functions as the supreme
legislative body for most EC activities except those stemming from the European Coal and Steel
611
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appears to grant jurisdiction to the Commission to decide these issues,27
subject to de novo review by the European Court of Justice as specified in
Article 173.2' However, other Treaty provisions make this situation more
complex. Article 87(1) gives the Council - i.e., the member state govern-
ments that constitute the Council - three years to enact unanimously
regulations "with a view to the application of the principles set out in Articles
85 and 86,,29 following which it may adopt further regulations by qualified
majority vote. Article 87(2) lists issues which the Treaty's authors felt the
document did not resolve, calling for adoption of regulations and directives
(a) to ensure observance . . . of the prohibitions referred to in Article 85(1) . . . (b) to
determine the particulars of the application of Article 85(3) . . . (c) to specify, where
necessary, the scope of the application in the various economic sectors of the provisions
contained in Articles 85 and 86 . . . (d) to define the respective responsibilities of the
Commission and of the Court of Justice in the application of the provisions referred to in this
paragraph . . . (e) to define the relation between . . . municipal law and . . . the provisions
contained in this Section or adopted in application of this Article.3"
The contents of Article 87 demonstrate that the drafters of the Treaty of Rome
did not agree upon many of the procedural and substantive issues present in
Articles 85 and 86.
Articles 88 and 89 render the jurisdictional puzzle still more complex. The
latter two provisions divide competence between the Commission and the
constituent states. Article 88 states that
[u]ntil the date of the entry into force of the provisions adopted in application of Article 87,
the authorities of Member States shall, in accordance with their respective municipal laws and
with the provisions of Article 85, particularly paragraph 3, and of Article 86, rule upon the
admissibility of any understanding and upon any improper advantage taken of a dominant
position in the Common Market."
The article does not specify whether the authorities are to apply their own
interpretation of articles 85 and 86 or the interpretation of the Commission or
Community. Decisions are taken by either weighted majority vote or unanimous vote, depending on the
area under consideration.
(2) The Commission is made up of 17 civil servants appointed by common accord of the member
states' governments. It proposes legislation to the Council, implements and administers Community law
and policy, and, to some extent, serves as the Community's executive branch.
(3) The European Court of Justice consists of 12 members. It may consider actions brought against
member states alleging their failure to fulfil EC obligations, actions against the Council or the
Commission alleging their failure to act in conformity with EC law, and references from national courts
for preliminary rulings to clarify the meaning and scope of Community law. A Court of First Instance
hears some cases before the senior Court does.
(4) The European Parliament, elected by direct universal suffrage since 1978, has limited powers
to supervise the work of the Commission and Council. Through a complex "cooperation procedure,"
the Parliament may reject proposed Council legislation, forcing that body to vote unanimously to
override the Parliamentary veto.
See KLAus-DIETER BORCHARDT, THE ABC OF COMMUNrrY LAW 15-24, 24-34 (3rd ed. 1991).
27. Treaty of Rome, supra note 17, art. 155; GOYDER, supra note 28, at 27.
28. Treaty of Rome, supra note 17, art. 173.
29. id. art. 87(1).
30. Id. art. 85(2).
31. Id. art. 88.
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the European Court of Justice. Article 89 instructs the Commission to "ensure
the application of the principles laid down in Articles 85 and 86" by
investigating "any alleged infringement" after which "it shall propose
appropriate means for [bringing it] to an end. "32
Other questions arise from the fact that the Treaty of Rome does not
explicitly place merger control under Community purview. Evidence suggests
that the Treaty's authors considered that option and either explicitly rejected
it or bypassed it when they could not agree on common criteria and
procedures.33 At the very least, it is clear that the Treaty's authors were
aware of the uses of merger control and the possibilities for a Community
role.34 Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak's 1955 report to the
Council, which formed one of the bases for the text of the Treaty of Rome,
discussed the need to control the formation of monopolies." In addition, the
Treaty Instituting the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC Treaty)
contained explicit merger control provisions which required merging firms to
notify Community institutions prior to merger.36
Given this experience under the ECSC Treaty, why might the drafters of
the Treaty of Rome have rejected Community-level merger control?
According to one theory, the original EC member states sought to encourage,
rather than restrict, concentration of European industry. Their goal was to
allow war-ravaged and historically under-industrialized Europe to attain
American levels of industrialization by encouraging the formation of
American-sized industrial giants.37 However, that motive alone does not fully
explain the failure to include merger control in the Treaty of Rome. In fact,
had the creation of industrial giants been their only goal, the drafters could
have explicitly encouraged mergers in the Treaty provisions. The absence of
merger regulation in the Treaty suggests that additional factors were at work,
such as a divergence of strategic interests both within governments and
between governments. 38
32. Id. art. 89.
33. GOYDER, supra note 18, at 29; see also Advocate-General Roemer's opinion in Continental
Can, Case 6/72, Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co. v. Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 215, 253-
56; MERGER CONTROL IN THE EEC 222 (1988) [hereinafter MERGER CONTROL].
34. See T. ANTONY DowNEs & JULIAN ELLISON, THE LEGAL CONTROL OF MERGERS IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 2 (1991). Advocate-General Roemer drew the same conclusion in arguing
against Commission authority to police mergers generally in his opinion in Continental Can, Case 6/72,
Europemballage Corp. and Continental Can Co. v. Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 215, 256. Moreover,
Roemer went on to argue that the Treaty's drafters intended to allow formation of full-fledged
monopolies, so long as there was no actual "abuse" of the dominant position, because they deliberately
chose to exclude language similar to that found in Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Id.
35. Spaak Report, cited in GOYDER, supra note 18, at 23.
36. Treaty Instituting the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, art. 66(1), 261
U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC Treaty].
37. MERGER CONTROL, supra note 33, at 223; see also Aurelio Pappalardo, Le RNglement CEE
Sur Le Contr6le Des Concentrations, I REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROrr ECONOMIQUE 3, 4 (1990).
On the Community's pro-concentration ethos, at least through the 1960s, see Bos, supra note 24, at 6.
38. See infra notes 138, 145-176, 181-184, and 224-234 and accompanying text. Merger control
represents one area in which idealistic "common destiny" motivations run up against traditional state
interests. Stanley Hoffmann and Robert 0. Keohane make a similar point about the European
613
Schwartz EC Merger Control
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
In sum, the competition provisions in the Treaty of Rome left many
questions unanswered. The Treaty did not resolve whether competition alone
or competition plus industrial policy should motivate the application of the
competition provisions; in addition, the Treaty did not determine precisely
where authority lies.39 Even at its origins EC competition policy raised two
sets of questions: normative questions about what economic principles inspired
and should govern such a policy, and political questions about who would
administer competition policy and who might be bound by it.
B. The 1966 Memorandum
In 1966, the Commission issued a memorandum on concentrations that
stated that "it is not possible to apply Article 85 to agreements whose purpose
is the acquisition of total or partial ownership of enterprises or the reorganiza-
tion of the ownership of enterprises (merger, acquisition of holdings, purchase
of part of the assets)."'  The memo offered a number of arguments to
support that conclusion, faulting Article 85 for both over-inclusiveness and
under-inclusiveness.
First, the strict criteria of Article 85(1) would preclude too many
permissible mergers and therefore were over-inclusive.41 On the other hand,
the exemption criteria in Article 85(3) might create an industrial policy
loophole that would gut the effectiveness of merger control, a situation that
rendered Article 85 under-inclusive. In addition, any exemption granted would
Community's relaunch in the late 1980s. They assert that the relaunch resulted, as did the Treaty of
Rome, "less from a coherent burst of idealism than from a convergence of national interests around a
new pattern of economic policy-making." Institutional Change, supra note 15, at 23. The two scholars
point out that while in the 1950s economic policy-making took the form, broadly speaking, of a
"Keynesian synthesis," in the 1980s the paradigm was at least in part "neo-liberal" and "deregulatory."
This meshes well with a point this article makes below: one reason states were initially willing to
consider merger control in the 1980s was that each member state hoped that transferring authority over
mergers to Brussels would dismantle barriers to acquisitions by its own firms in other member states.
See infra notes 298, 302 and accompanying text.
39. See GOYDER, supra note 18, at 27-30. Goyder attributes these ambiguities to the need for
cooperation. In short, doubt was written into the text to allow future power relationships to clarify
themselves. This comports with a general understanding of the Treaty as not merely an effort to secure
economic well-being for Europe, or to advance a common economic ideology or political vision, but,
to put it bluntly, as a "way" for the French "to tie down their old enemies, the Germans," and for
Germany to bind itself just enough to reassure the rest. The European Revolution, THE ECONOMIST,
Nov. 9, 1991, at 60.
A comparison with the Treaty Instituting the European Coal and Steel Community, adopted in
1952, is instructive. This earlier pact laid out far stricter criteria for controlling competition and placed
decision-making firmly in the hands of the High Authorities. ECSC Treaty, supra note 36, arts. 65 &
66. The strict controls on competition stemmed from American post-war pressure as Washington sought
to limit the resurgence of German industry. David Allen, Policing or Policy-Making? Competition
Policy in the European Communities, in PoLICY-MAKINO IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 91, 94
(Helen Wallace et al. eds., 1977).
40. Memorandum on the Problem of Concentrations in the Common Market, Competition Series,
No. 3, 1966, para. 58, cited in DOWNES, supra note 34, at 14.
41. Barry E. Hawk, The EEC Merger Regulation: The First Step Toward One-Stop Merger
Control, 59 ANTrrRUsr L.J. 195, 196 (1990).
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be revocable according to the procedures established in Regulation 17,42 the
1962 Regulation which specified the procedures to be followed by the
Commission in several areas of EC competition control. This revocability of
completed mergers would upset vested property rights.43 Furthermore,
Article 85(2)'s declaration that offensive agreements are "automatically void"
would make it an extremely crude tool for controlling mergers. Finally,
Article 85 might not cover actions, such as open market purchases of shares,
where one could not point to an "agreement" or "concerted practice," but that
nonetheless facilitated concentrations that damaged competition.'
Despite these criticisms, the memo's legal argument was weak." Indeed,
a panel of legal experts had suggested, contrary to the Commission's opinion,
that Article 85 might make an adequate vehicle for merger control.46 As the
1966 Memorandum recognized, the exemptions under Article 85(3) could have
provided a way to evade the constraints of the automatic prohibitions of
Article 85(1). Moreover, since Article 9(1) of Regulation 17 gives the
Commission the sole power to grant exemptions envisioned under Treaty of
Rome Article 85(3), the Commission could exercise its authority flexibly and
consistently.47 Admittedly, Article 4(1) of Regulation 17 did complicate the
Commission's power to exempt, restricting it to only those deals of which it
has been notified.48 However, the Commission might have attempted to use
this requirement to force adherence to a pre-notification system of the very
sort it would seek to erect later, through adoption of the merger control
regulation in 1989.
Although it rejected Article 85 as a source of EC competition policy, the
1966 Memorandum did suggest that "'a concentration of enterprises which has
the effect of monopolizing a market should be treated as improper exploitation
of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 86, except where special
circumstances are present.'"' The Commission thus proposed treating
Article 86 as a source of control over only those concentrations which created
a monopoly. Nevertheless, the proposal offered a small opening for expanded
Community competency over mergers. The European Court of Justice picked
up on this opening seven years later in Continental Can."0
The EC politics of the mid-1960s helps explain why the Commission
rejected the applicability of Article 85 to merger control. In 1965 French
President De Gaulle sparked a crisis within the European Community when
he refused to allow France to participate in any EC decisions taken by
42. Council Regulation 17/62, 1959-1962 O.J., art. 8(1). For a discussion of the genesis of
Regulation 17 see GOYDER, supra note 18, at 31-43.
43. Hawk, supra note 41, at 195, 196.
44. MERGER CONTROL, supra note 33, at 224.
45. Bos, supra note 24, at 5-6.
46. MERGER CONTROL, supra note 33, at 223 n.3.
47. The Commission has not made much use of its power to exempt. CHRISTOPHER W. BELLAMY
& GRAHAM D. CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION 130-34 (3d ed. 1987).
48. See id. at 134 n. 42; Council Regulation 17/62, supra note 42, art. 4(1).
49. Hawk, supra note 41, at 196.
50. Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co. v. EC Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 215.
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qualified majority rather than by unanimous vote. De Gaulle believed that all
authority over EC matters, even in the event of a "political union," should be
vested in the heads of state acting unanimously and that the Commission, the
Court of Justice, and other EC institutions should play a minor role at best in
European policy." De Gaulle's position had major implications for competi-
tion policy, since under Article 87 qualified majority voting was to apply three
years after the Treaty of Rome came into force. The Luxembourg Accords of
January, 1966 - in which the EC members reached a non-binding agreement
to attempt to decide "very important interests" by unanimous vote - offered
only a fragile solution to the dispute. 2 Clearly, 1966 was a politically
inauspicious time for the Commission to take an activist stance by discovering
new powers for itself within the Treaty of Rome.
The French crisis alone does not explain the Commission's decision to
issue a memorandum criticizing Article 85 as a tool of merger control. If the
Commission were simply concerned with avoiding potentially controversial
interpretations of the Treaty of Rome in the prevailing political climate, the
Commission could have invoked familiar arguments about the original intent
of the Treaty of Rome's signatories,53 and dispensed with legal arguments
over Article 85's potential use. By shifting discussion of the jurisdiction
accorded to the Community by the Treaty of Rome from the realm of
historical evidence regarding the intent of the signatories, the memo helped
dissipate strict limits on Treaty interpretation. By casting the memo's
conclusion in legal terms, the Commission opened a door for altered
interpretations in the future. One of these new interpretations might bring
Article 85 back to life when the political situation permitted. The memo
helped convert the Treaty from a text that granted limited authority based on
literal readings and original intent, into one that, through expansive reading,
could be interpreted as granting broad-based, discretionary authority to
govern, to make decisions, and to interpret the Treaty of Rome for the good
of the European Community as a whole.
III. EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE DECISIONS DURING THE 1970s
A convergence of factors in the early 1970s briefly peaked expectations
of an EC relaunch.54 The period of American-Soviet d6tente sparked
European anxiety over the American commitment to NATO, and the dollar
crisis of the late 1960s and 1970s led to the formation of the European
51. On the Luxembourg Crisis and De Gaulle's views of proper institutional power see generally
P.J.G. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES 21-22 (2d ed. 1989).
52. TREVOR C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 18-20 (2d ed.
1988).
53. Advocate-General Roemer invoked such arguments in Continental Can. See infra notes 60, 63
and accompanying text.
54. Keohane and Hoffmann note that the strengthening of European institutions, predicted under
what they term the political economy hypothesis, could have occurred at any time after 1973.
Institutional Change, supra note 15, at 23.
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Monetary System in 1978." 5 Charles De Gaulle had resigned the French
Presidency in 1969, which, in turn, facilitated Great Britain's entry into the
Community in 1973. The Paris Summit of 1974 created the European Council,
under whose auspices heads of state would meet several times a year, and
ordered a high-level report on the potential for political union. 6 This
political background is vital to an understanding of the 1973 ruling of the
European Court of Justice in Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co.
v. EC Commission,57 for it helps explain both the timing and content of the
radically expansive decision handed down by the Court.
Continental Can, a New York manufacturer of metal containers and other
packages, held close to ninety percent of the nominal capital of a German
company, SLW, that specialized in metal packaging for meat, fish, and
crustacea. In 1969, Continental Can agreed with the Dutch firm Thomassen
& Drijver Verblifa (TDV) and the British firm Metal Box to set up a new
European holding company, Europemballage Corporation. The new firm
would then purchase the majority shares of TDV, which, like SLW, special-
ized in packaging for preserved meats, fish, and crustacea, and in metal caps
for glass containers.
The Commission learned of the plan and warned the participants that in
the Commission's opinion Continental Can's SLW subsidiary gave the U.S.
corporation dominance in the market for meat, fish, and crustacea packaging
in a "substantial part" of the Common Market. As a result, the Commission
threatened to charge Continental Can and Europemballage with violating
Article 86(1) of the Treaty of Rome. Metal Box pulled out of the deal, but
Continental Can went ahead, creating the holding company Europemballage,
which bought a ninety-one percent stake in TDV.
The Commission, acting under powers granted to it in Article 3 of
Regulation 17, prohibited the concentration as a violation of Treaty of Rome
Article 86. Continental Can challenged the ruling in the European Court of
Justice under Treaty of Rome Article 173. The corporation first questioned the
Commission's jurisdiction over American companies. It also argued that
Article 86 applied only to behavior that affected consumers (an actual abuse
of a dominant position), not to mere structural change of the market through
the creation or strengthening of market concentration.5" It adduced historical
evidence of the intent of the drafters of the Treaty of Rome, drawing support
55. These factors are similar to some of those that contributed to the 1980s relaunch fifteen years
later, such as the IMF Treaty, General Secretary Gorbachev's rapprochement with Presidents Reagan
and Bush, and the instability of the dollar under the Reagan Administration in the mid 1980s. In
particular, instability in American monetary policy, and Europeans' ensuing decision to seek greater
autonomy in monetary policy, were factors both in the decision to form the European Monetary System
in 1978 and in the decision to broach suggestions for European monetary union beginning in the mid-
1980s. See id. at 23.
56. KAPTEYN, supra note 51, at 23-26; see also Institutional Change, supra note 15, at 16.
57. 1973 E.C.R. 215.
58. Id. at 225. Continental accused the Commission of wrongly interpreting the Treaty of Rome
through the lenses of American anti-trust law, "whose sources, philosophy and history are, however,
different from those of the competition law created by the six Member States." Id. at 228. Advocate-
General Roemer echoed that view in his opinion. Id. at 256.
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from what they left out of that text. Continental Can observed that the Treaty
is conspicuously silent on merger control, in contrast to the ECSC Treaty,
which explicitly provided for such control, and concluded that the drafters
were conscious of the possibility of incorporating merger control into the
Treaty of Rome but deliberately did not do so. 9 Continental Can finally
asserted that even if Article 86 applied to mergers, it could apply only
narrowly, as where the acquiring firm deliberately wielded its prior domi-
nance as an instrument in the creation of an abusive level of concentration. In
this light, even the Commission conceded that Continental Can's market
strength had had nothing to do with its acquisition of TDV shares and had not
been brought to bear against TDV in any way.60
Continental Can prevailed on the merits. The Court found that the
Commission had failed to prove that the relevant market should be defined as
the specialized one of light metal packages for preserved meats, fish, and
crustacea - the smaller market in which SLW was allegedly dominant -
rather than the larger market for metal packaging in general. The Court also
noted that Continental Can would not be immune from competition from other
types of packaging, and this would diminish its market strength.61
While the Court held for Continental Can on the facts of this case, the
opinion is more remarkable for its interpretation of Article 86 in a light that
would be favorable to the Commission's exercise of jurisdiction in the future.
The Court accepted the Commission's interpretation of Article 86 as banning
mergers that strengthew a dominant position. In so doing, the Court rejected
the opinion of Advocate-General Roemer, who argued that Article 86 could
not apply to mergers unless the acquiror used a dominant position to force a
competitor to merge.62 The justices explicitly rejected the argument from
comparison with the ECSC Treaty, 63 and all but ignored the Advocate-
General's lengthy historical analysis of the original intent of the drafters and
signatories of the Treaty of Rome.
Instead, the justices appealed to what they termed "the spirit, general
scheme and wording of Article 86, as well as to the system and objectives of
the Treaty."" From the broad statement of principle in Treaty of Rome
Article 2, which instructs the European Community "to promote throughout
the Community a harmonious development of economic activities," the Court
derived a fundamental Treaty "aim," which it declared to be "decisive" when
interpreting provisions such as Article 86.65 The Court also mustered support
for its ruling from Treaty Article 3(f), which calls for "the institution of a
system ensuring that competition in the Common Market is not distorted
... " The Court challenged the argument that Article 86 applied only to a
59. Id. at 224.
60. Id. at 253. (Advocate-General Roemer's points). Note that Advocate-General Roemer himself
accepted Continental Can's extremely narrow reading of what forms of mergers the Treaty could cover.
61. Id. at 226-27, 247-48.
62. Id. at 256.
63. Id. at 243.
64. Id. at 243.
65. Id. at 244.
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firm's abuse of a dominant position and not to structural change the firm
induced in the market, noting that "[t]he distinction between measures which
concern the structure of the undertaking and practices which affect the market
cannot be decisive, for any structural measure may influence market
conditions."66 The Court also rejected the argument that Article 86 required
some "link of causality . . . between the dominant position and its abuse."67
Finally, the Court established a benchmark for determining when the
strengthening of dominance amounts to abuse: the attainment of a "degree of
dominance" that "substantially fetters competition, [such] that only undertak-
ings remain in the market whose behavior depends on the dominant one. ,
68
Continental Can is the "best known" example of the European Court of
Justice's use of a "teleological approach" to analyzing the Treaty of Rome. 9
Under this approach, the Court interprets the intent of the Treaty's drafters
in light of some perceived "spirit"7 of the Treaty, thereby giving an integra-
tionist meaning to the text. Professor Joseph Weiler notes that, beginning in
1973, the Community underwent a period in which "the principle of
enumerated powers as a constraint on Community material jurisdiction (absent
Treaty revision) substantially eroded and in practice virtually disappeared."71
The opinion of the European Court in Continental Can reflects this process.
On merger control in particular, Continental Can was one of a number of
decisions that, taken cumulatively, created the potential for increased
Commission authority.
Following Continental Can, a number of cases strengthened the Commis-
sion's ability to use Article 86 to preempt practices it deemed anti-competi-
tive. In 1978, in United Brands Co. & United Brands Continental B. V. v.
Commission,7" the Court upheld the Commission's decision that an-American
banana vendor had violated Article 86 by prohibiting its distributors from
selling bananas while they were still green. The vendor had thus made it
difficult for fruit to cross borders while still ripe, allowing it to charge
different prices in different regions. Additionally, the company had refused
to sell bananas to a Danish firm that also bought fruit from a rival. The
Commission found these practices to be "unfair,"' and the Court agreed.
The Court in United Brands defined "dominance" as the "position of
economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking, which enables it. . . to behave
to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and
66. Id. at 242.
67. Id. at 245.
68. Id. at 245. Some commentators suggest that the Court set up a "substantial" fettering test as
an antidote to the radicalism of its interpretation of Article 86 as requiring dominance rather than abuse
to find illegality. See Bos, supra note 24, at 11.
69. GOYDER, supra note 18, at 71 n.1.
70. Continental Can, 1973 E.C.R. 215, 243.
71. J. H. H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2434-35 (1991).
72. Case 27/6, United Brands Co. & United Brands Continental B.V. v. Commission, 1978 E.C.R.
207.
73. Id. at 268.
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ultimately of its consumers."74 Dominance, then, does not mean the elimina-
tion of all competition from the market. Rather, the label applies to any
market position that "hinder[s] to a large extent any effective competition from
competitors who can only .. . secure the same advantages after great
exertions."75 The Court also attempted to flesh out the meaning of the term
"abusive," defining it to cover actions that "limit markets to the prejudice of
consumers. 7 6 Imposing "unfair purchase or selling prices"'  and reaping
"trading benefits which [the firm] would not have reaped if there had been
normal and sufficiently effective competition" would also be abusive.
Because the Court did not define these phrases precisely, the Court effectively
gave the Commission more leeway to find corporate consolidation abusive.
In Hoffinann-La Roche & Co. v. Commission, 9 the Court lowered
Continental Can's "substantially fettering" threshold for abuse. o In Hoffman-
La Roche the Court defined abuse as
an objective concept relating to the behavior of an undertaking in a dominant position which
is such as to influence the structure of a market where, as a result of the very presence of the
undertaking in question, the degree of competition is weakened, [and that behavior] has the
effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing."
Whereas Continental Can's test of abuse looked for the creation of an
oligopolistic market with a dominant firm, Hoffman-La Roche's test of abuse
looked only for a weakening of the level of competition that existed prior to
the challenged behavior. Some experts on EC jurisprudence believe that
Hoffman-La Roche continued a trend whereby the Court slowly lowered the
Continental Can hurdle, which had required a "substantial" effect on
competition for Article 86 to apply.82
Thus, by the end of the decade, the Court considered a "weakening" rather
than a "substantial fettering" of competition to be abusive. The measure of
dominance had shifted from the full elimination of competition, as in
Continental Can, to the ability to act to a large degree independently from
competition. It was still unclear whether the Court would apply the "weaken-
ing competition" test only to abusive market behavior, but still apply the
"substantially fettering test" to structural change, such as mergers and
takeovers. On the other hand, since "any large undertaking whose market
share is significantly higher than that of its next competitors will easily be
found to have a dominant position," the Court might find any strengthening
74. Id. at 277.
75. Id. at 276-77.
76. Id. at 289.
77. Id. at 301.
78. Id.
79. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461.
80. See MERGER CONTROL, supra note 33, at 232-33.




of that position to be abusive," even if the strengthening were due to
structural change.
In addition to the cases interpreting Article 86, a number of cases clarified
the Commission's authority over competition and enhanced the Commission's
potential power to police mergers through Article 86. One such decision,
Wilhelm & Ors v. Bundeskartellamt,"4 had preceded Continental Can by
several years. In Wilhelm & Ors the Court held that national competition
authorities may apply domestic competition law paralleling Community
decisions only if "the application of national law" does not "prejudice the full
and uniform application of Community law or the effects of measures taken
or to be taken to implement [EC law]. "" The Commission has interpreted
Wilhelm to mean that a Community decision to prohibit an action as in
violation of Article 86 overrides national approval, while a determination by
the Commission that an action does not infringe the Treaty (a "negative
clearance") does not necessarily preclude national prohibition.86 This
interpretation has not been tested.87 Furthermore, some question remains as
to what occurs when the Commission grants an exemption under Treaty of
Rome Article 85(3).88
In BRT v. SABAM, s9 decided one year after Continental Can, the Court
ruled that Articles 85 and 86 are "direct effect" articles, meaning that they
"create direct rights in respect of ... individuals." 9 As a result, individuals
may sue for enforcement of Articles 85 and 86 in national courts, subject to
some important caveats. Domestic courts hearing such cases are obligated to
treat the two articles and the European Court of Justice's jurisprudence under
them as incorporated into domestic law. The ramifications of this decision
would become an important issue in the drafting and application of any EC
merger regulation. After BRT, the drafters of a new regulation would have to
consider the degree to which that regulation would preempt Articles 85 and
86 of the Treaty. Barring a Treaty amendment, adoption of a merger
regulation alone.might not eliminate the Commission's and national authori-
ties' obligation to apply Articles 85 and 86 to merger cases because of the
direct effect of those articles. 9'
Cumulatively, these ECJ decisions yielded three important results: 1) they
recognized the application of Article 86 to merger control; 2) they established
83. I. VAN BAEL & J.F. BELLIS, COMPETITION LAW OF THE EEC 15 (2d ed. 1990).
84. Case 14/68, Wilhelm & Ors v. Bundeskartellamt, 1969 E.C.R. 1.
85. Id. at 17.
86. See VAN BAEL & BELUS, supra note 83, at 83-86 (citing Tenth Report on Competition Policy);
see also MERGER CONTROL, supra note 33, at 240-44. Wilhelm & Ors involved a Bundeskartellamt
decision to fine a group of dye companies for price fixing under German domestic law while the
Commission was still investigating the case under EC law. The narrow holding therefore applies only
when domestic merger authorities act on cases still pending before the Commission and the opinion's
broader ramifications remain speculative.
87. VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 83, at 85.
88. Id.
89. Case 127/73, BRT v. SABAM, 1974 E.C.R. 51.
90. Id. at 62.
91. See infra notes 302-390 and accompanying text.
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and then lowered thresholds for proving dominance and abuse; and 3) they
established the supremacy of EC competition law over domestic competition
law, and gave EC law "direct effect." By early 1980, then, the Court had
handed the Commission what could be a "powerful and flexible weapon for
dealing with mergers. "92
Although the Commission has had this weapon in hand, the Commission
has hardly wielded it. Continental Can represented the only time the
Commission has gone to Court to try to apply Article 86 to a merger. In
addition, the Commission has used the threat of an Article 86 action to win
changes to mergers only a handful of times, notably with the
BSN/Gervais/Danone and Amicon Corp/Fortia mergers. 93 Meanwhile, scores
of mammoth corporate marriages have gone unchecked by EC authorities,
including Alfa Romeo/Fiat, Brown-Boveri/Asea, AVEBE/KSH, Pont-t-
Mousson/Stanton, Eagle Star/Allianz, and the gargantuan MBB/Daimler Benz
merger. 94
Several aspects of Article 86 help explain this result. First, Article 86
seems to ban only misuse of a prior dominant position, not the creation of a
new dominant position as occurs in most mergers.95 This interpretation
suggests that the Commission cannot use Article 86 to control most mergers.
Some scholars have suggested that the Commission should have argued before
the Court that the term "dominance" should include collective dominance
because this broader definition would cover mergers involving firms that
dominated a market "jointly" along with others prior to the merger.96
However, the Commission never advanced this argument before the Court.
Second, Article 86 seems to give the Commission no power to intervene
until a merger is completed. This interpretation forces the Commission to
undertake the unenviable task of taking apart complex corporate combinations
after their completion.
In one case, however, Camera Care v. Commission, the Court ruled that
Article 3(1) of Regulation 17 implicitly gives the Commission authority to
take "interim protective measures" in cases of alleged violations of Commu-
nity competition policy.97 Observers have suggested that this might allow the
Commission to issue injunctions or order temporary halts to merger plans not
yet enacted. 9 However, under Camera Care the Court explicitly allowed the
Commission only to preempt a merger in order to avoid "serious and
irreparable damages to the party seeking [preemption]. ,99 In addition, the
Commission's decisions would be subject to Court review.
92. MERGER CONTROL, supra note 33, at 234.
93. Id. at 235.
94. See id. at 234, 254-57; see also DOWNEs, supra note 34, at 12-13. On the MBB/Daimler Benz
deal see infra notes 163-175 and accompanying text.
95. DowNEs, supra note 34, at 3; see also GOYDER, supra note 18, at 322.
96. MERGER CONTROL, supra note 33, at 286; see also VAN BAEL & BELLiS, supra note 83, at
67. A number of Commission decisions, though no Court case yet, have tested this notion.
97. Case 792/79R, Camera Care Ltd. v. Commission, 1980 E.C.R. 119, 131.
98. DowNFs, supra note 34, at 9.
99. Camera Care, 1980 E.C.R. at 131.
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The Commission has never tested the possibility of preempting a merger.
Instead, it has referred parties seeking injunctions to national courts,
recommending that they turn to Brussels only as a last resort." ° Rather than
exercise or seek to expand its Court-made powers and risk exacerbating
member states' resistance to entrusting the Community with merger control,
the Commission made a political decision to expand its powers through the
Council. 10
IV. POLITICAL LOGJAM: THE DECADE-LONG DEBATE OVER A MERGER
TEXT
In July 1973 the Commission placed a proposed merger regulation before
the Council. The draft would have granted the Commission authority to
review any merger involving at least one EC firm, in which the entities
involved had a world-wide turnover of over 200 million ECUs and more than
twenty-five percent market-share (measured by turnover) for a particular good
or service in at least one EC member state. 10 2 For proposed mergers
creating entities with over 1 billion -ECUs in turnover, the participants would
be required to give prior notification to the Commission.0 3 The draft text
defined any merger that would enable firms to "acquire or enhance the power
to hinder effective competition" and to affect trade between member states to
be incompatible with the Common Market."° The Commission would use
classic competition criteria, such as product substitution, supply and demand,
and financial power of the firms involved, to evaluate the effects of the
proposed merger. 5 The draft attempted to resolve the pure-competition-
versus-industrial-policy debate by allowing for the exemption of concentrations
in EC economic sectors designated for "priority treatment."1' 6 Pure competi-
tion would serve as the baseline criterion for evaluating mergers, but the
Commission would carve out certain sectors for exemption on industrial policy
grounds. Ultimate authority to rule both on mergers and on the sectors to
receive "priority treatment" would rest with the Commission, although the
Commission would ask the Council for an opinion from an Advisory
Committee of experts appointed by the member states.7
Although the European Parliament endorsed the draft,1"8 the proposed
regulation failed the test before the member states in Council. Several themes
100. Practice Note, 28 C.M.L.R. 369 at para. 3 (1980).
101. Interview with Helmut Schr6ter, official with Directorate General IV's Merger Team, in
Brussels, Belgium (Mar. 19, 1991) [hereinafter Schr6ter Interview]. See also MERGER CONTROL, supra
note 33, at 285-89.
102. Draft Regulation of the E.C. Council Concerning Control of Concentrations between
Undertakings, COM (73) 1210 final, reprinted in 12 C.M.L.R. D205, D207 (1973).
103. Id. at D209.
104. Id at D207.
105. Id.
106. Id. at D206, D208.
107. Id. at D215.
108. Allen, supra note 39, at 106.
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emerge from the Council debates over the draft. Member states could not
agree on the fundamental normative issues, the economic and social principles
on which EC merger control should be based. Key among these was whether
the regulation should provide for evaluation of mergers solely for their effects
on competition or instead reflect some industrial policy goals like those in the
Treaty of Rome's Article 85(3). If the latter were the case, the Commission
would be able to approve anti-competitive mergers on the basis of other
factors. These factors might include a merger's social or regional effects, its
contribution to technological development, or even its consonance with activist
industrial policy goals set by the Community's member states. Given the
latitude inherent in these factors, the member states' positions on the pure-
competition-versus-industrial-policy debate differed significantly.
France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Ireland sought clear rules that
would permit anti-competitive mergers if they accomplished industrial policy,
social, or regional goals." 9 Italy in particular feared that without such rules,
the EC would meddle in its mammoth public holding companies and hinder
expansion by Italian firms that the Italian government perceived to be too
small relative to other European entities. Italy, therefore, expressed reserva-
tions about the entire merger control project.10
Germany and Denmark, on the other hand, wanted mergers to be
evaluated solely for their effect on competition. The Benelux states and
Ireland joined Germany and Denmark in resisting any Italian-sought
exemptions for public enterprises. 1 ' However, the Benelux states petitioned
for exemptions for banking concerns, which are important in their econo-
mies.1 '2
In addition to demonstrating member states' disagreement over the goals
of competition policy, the debate over the 1973 draft shows that several
member states did not want to cede any authority to the Commission.
Germany, Denmark, and the Benelux group wanted final authority over
mergers to rest with the Commission, while France, Italy, and the United
Kingdom wanted that authority to remain in the Council.' As a result of
these disagreements, the Council rejected the draft regulation.
It took the Commission eight years to present a new draft regulation." 4
In the 1981 draft, the Commission tried to ensure Council approval by
limiting the area to be brought under Commission authority. The new draft
109. MERGER CONTROL, supra note 33, at 282; see also Rapport d'lnformation, Delegation du
Senat (France) Pour ]a C.E., June 1-Dec. 31, 1982, at 87.
110. MERGER CONTROL, supra note 33, at 281; see also Rapport d'Information, supra note 109,
at 86.
111. MERGER CONTROL, supra note 33, at 281.
112. Rapport d'Information, supra note 109, at 87.
113. MERGER CONTROL, supra note 33, at 282; Rapport d'Information, supra note 109, at 87. See
also Comit6 Economique et Social, Avis du Comit6 dconomique et social sur la "Modification de la
proposition de r~glement du Conseil sur le contr6le de la concentration" Doc. No. COM (81) 773
(1982) (final).
114. Modification de la proposition de r~glement du Conseil sur le contrble de ]a concentration,
COM(81) 773 (final).
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changed the 1973 draft's "dominant position" threshold from 200 million
ECUs to 500 million ECUs." 5 The 1981 draft would presume that mergers
involving entities with a combined market share of less than twenty percent
based on turnover in the Community as a whole were permissible." 6 By
contrast, the 1973 draft had contained an exemption, rather than a presump-
tion, for mergers that resulted in firms that did not have a combined turnover
in any product in any member state of more than twenty-five percent of the
market. The 1981 draft exempted mergers involving the acquisition of firms
with under thirty million ECUs turnover. As in the 1973 draft, in the 1981
draft the Commission again proposed that final authority over mergers rest
with it, not the Council." 7
The new proposal, like its predecessor, failed before the Council because
of divisions among the member states. The Commission submitted a third
proposal three years later, in February 1984. Once again it raised the turnover
threshold over which the Commission could prohibit mergers, this time to 750
million ECUs - three times the original 1973 proposal. Below that threshold,
mergers would be subject to regulation only if they produced companies with
a fifty percent market share (by turnover) in a given product in a substantial
part of the Community. The Commission pledged to consult the Council
frequently, but insisted on retaining final authority."' Like its predecessors,
the third proposal died in the Council.
V. DOMESTIC MERGER CONTROL: NATIONAL INTEREST UBER ALLES
Histories of the negotiations on the three proposed merger regulations and
the final talks leading to the 1989 Regulation report that the talks faltered in
part because the Council members could not resolve the industrial-policy-
versus-pure-competition debate." 9 These works present France and Italy as
leading the industrial policy camp,"' and Great Britain (under Thatcher) and
Germany as championing a regime of pure competition, resisting a transfer
of authority if the Commission would not be as dedicated to pure competition
as their own domestic authorities. ' 2
This Part of the present article argues that the Council debate was not as
sharply defined as this description suggests. Merger control was, and to a
large extent remains, a highly politicized aspect of government economic
115. Id. Annex, at 2.
116. Id. at 1.
117. Id. at3.
118. Commission des Communautes Europeennes, Proposition Modifee de R~glement du Conseil
sur le contr6le de la concentration, Doc. No. COM(84) 59 (final); see also Concurrence: Avis de la
Commission CEE sur les Fusions et les Joint Ventures, EUROPOLITIQUE, Sept. 20, 1986, at 4, 5.
119. See, e.g., MERGER CONTROL, supra note 33, at 282; William Dawkins, French Coax EC
States Towards Entente on Merger Controls, FIN. TIMEs, July 31, 1989, at 2.
120. See, e.g., Concurrence: Sir Leon Brittan Met des Gantspour EvoquerAvec les Ministres CEE
le Controle des Concentrations, EUROPOLITIQUE, May 10, 1989, at 4, 5; see also infra note 324 and
accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 290-294 and 296-297 and accompanying text.
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intervention for all of the member states, including Great Britain and
Germany. In each state, final discretion remains with a minister who can
overrule competition authorities.2
During the 1980s, domestic regimes moved away from state-oriented
(dirigiste) and discretionary industrial intervention towards deregulatory
economics and more purely competitive policies.1" The European
Community's relaunch, including the adoption of a merger control regulation
in 1989, therefore, can be attributed partly to a convergence of economic
policies among the twelve EC states. 24 However, while the apparent end
of this convergence was consensus, below the surface the consensus on norms
to guide a Community-wide regime is less clear. France's shift to deregulatory
economics, for instance, was less than met the eye.'" In addition to broad
economic motives, broad strategic concerns, chiefly the desire to rein in an
increasingly strong and, by decade's end, newly-united Germany, encouraged
France to support Community relaunch in the mid-to-late 1980s. Yet on
specific economic measures, such as merger control, the French were (and
remain) deeply reluctant to consign powers to Brussels.126
Germany also took a position during the merger regulation talks that
appeared to be consistent with its rhetorical commitment to pure competition
and its domestic economic ideology. Yet the need to keep European markets
open to German exports also provided strong inducement to cooperate on a
common merger control regime, 27 as did the need to persuade its neighbors
that a united Germany would be a good Community player. Moreover, there
were (and still are) also industrial policy tendencies running beneath the
surface in Germany.128 The German government had to balance its interest
in preserving competition against its interest in pacifying domestic industries
complaining of disadvantage vis-t-vis industries in countries with stronger
industrial policy regimes.
Great Britain, despite Prime Minister Thatcher's free market stance, also
allowed government discretion in merger control and was unwilling to transfer
that prerogative to Brussels. 29 Moreover, Britain might have hoped that a
common regime in Brussels would lower barriers to acquisitions across the
Continent, and thus help London banking interests as well as British firms that
felt that they were unprotected targets for foreign raiders at home, while
122. HERVE DUMEZ & ALAIN JEUNEMAITRE, LA CONCURRENCE EN EUROPE: DE NOUVELLES
REGLES Du JEu POUR LEs ENTREPRISES 278-80 (1991). See also infra notes 153, 197, 210-237 and
accompanying text.
123. Institutional Change, supra note 15, at 21-23.
124. Wayne Sandholtz & John Zysman, 1992: Recasting the European Bargain, 42 WORLD POL.
95, 111-12 (1990).
125. See infra notes 179-206 and accompanying text.
126. This desire to have the European Community control policy but at the same time to avoid
surrendering French authority to the Community had been present in De Gaulle's plans for "political
union" in the early 1960s. He sought to have the Council retain full control over all policy but require
that actions be taken by unanimous vote, thereby effectively giving France a veto.
127. Institutional Change, supra note 15, at 28.
128. See infra notes 137-176 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 297-301 and accompanying text.
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remaining stymied in their attempts to acquire continental companies.13
When it became apparent that Community control would not accomplish that
goal, however, Britain withheld its support for a Community-based merger
policy. Great Britain became the last member state to lift its basic reservations
to the idea of EC merger control.
The sections that follow sketch some of the real interests behind the
positions taken by the major players in EC merger regulation. The discussion
complicates the idea that EC member states supported Community merger
control because of consensus on neutral economic policy norms or ideology.
Rather, while the 1989 Regulation embodied an apparent Community-level
consensus on goals, merger control is in fact deeply entangled with national
politics.
A. Germany
Germany's economic policy and industrial structure have their roots in the
concept of a "social market economy."'' The initial proponents of this
concept, including the first Federal Minister of Economics, Ludwig Erhard,
believed that the dispersal of political powers under a loose form of federalism
Along with a high degree of industrial deconcentration would allow both
market-based competition and individual freedoms to flourish.'32 This theory
reflected the Germans' popular distrust of industrial concentration, a distrust
that developed as a reaction to the close association among industrialists,
cartels, and Nazism.'33
Despite the "social market economic" theory, however, Germany's
post-war political and economic rebirth has relied considerably, some might
say excessively, on collusion among major industries, banks, and regional
political bodies with mutual interests and holdings in one another.' The
result of these two tendencies is perpetual tension between economic
decentralization and concentration.
Germany portrays itself as having the strictest prohibitions against
industrial concentration in Europe, and observers of the European Community
consider German antitrust authorities to be Europe's strongest.'35 The
B undeskartellamt, the federal authority responsible for antitrust control, is an
island of authority independent of political coercion, devoted to a "competition
aber alles" approach.'36 Notwithstanding the Bundeskartellamt's reputation
130. See infra notes 297-298 and accompanying text. This motive meshes with broader British
reasons for supporting the EC relaunch: the desire to win deregulation across the continent to aid British
banking interests and to favor Britain's bid to become an off-shore manufacturing site for non-EC firms.
131. See generally ERIC OWEN SMrrH, THE WEsT GERMAN ECONOMY 19-23 (1983).
132. Id. at 22-24.
133. DuMEz & JEUNEMAITRE, supra note 122, at 161.
134. SMITH, supra note 131, at 22-24.
135. DuMEz & JEUNEMAITRE, supra note 122, at 123; see also Andrew Fisher, Merger Policy
Talks Please German Cartel-busters, FIN. TIMEs, Jan. 9, 1989, at 3.
136. Defending the Small Man, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1978, at Supplement. While the
Bundeskartellamt is statutorily a division of the Ministry of Economics, the Bundeskartellamt functions
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for independence and integrity, however, Germans and non-Germans alike
perpetually debate whether Germany's closely-knit banks and industries wield
too much influence in German society. 37 Kenneth Dyson found the German
government-banking-industry network to be far more concentrated than its
counterpart in any other Western state, and described the network as the
"structural bedrock" of Germany's economy. 13' German banks do have a
substantial hold over the nation's industry. A 1977 German Monopolies
Commission inquiry found that twenty-two of twenty-seven major German
banks had holdings in the top 100 German firms that amounted to more than
twenty-five percent of the stock of those firms. The Commission concluded
that the banks "substantially influence a good portion of the overall decision-
making of the large firms."'39 A 1986 Monopolies Commission report found
that Deutsche Bank held seats on supervisory boards for thirty-nine of the 100
largest companies. Among the same group of 100 companies, Dresdner Bank
held twenty-two seats, and Commerzbank fifteen. 140 Moreover, within the
financial industry itself, by 1988 the ten largest German financial institutions
held 37.3 percent of all financial institution assets.' 4'
Industrial firms have experienced a similar trend toward concentration
since World War II. In 1954, the top 100 firms yielded one-third of German
gross domestic product; by 1960, the top fifty firms did so.'42 A 1976
Monopolies Commission study found that the top 100 firms held shares in
4,300 smaller firms and participated in one half of all mergers, having
absorbed 436 companies outright.'43 The number of mergers and the degree
of large firm participation in smaller firms reached new heights throughout
most of the decade.
German merger control policy reveals the tension between pure competi-
tion and the facilitation of industrial self-organization. Thus, though the 1958
independently. It has independent powers to initiate investigations, subpoena witnesses, search and seize
documents, and render decisions. Ten sections staffed entirely by civil servants cover various sectors
of the German economy. These sections render judgements on their own; the President of the agency
plays only a supervisory role. See DTMEZ & JEUNEMAITRE, supra note 122, at 121-25, 132-36; SMITH,
supra note 131, at 273. The Monopoly Commission, an advisory body composed of five experts
appointed by the West German President, assists the Bundeskartellamit in efforts to maintain a pro-
competitive ethos. The Commission publishes biennial reports on the state of West German competition,
can publish additional reports on issues or industrial developments of its choosing, and must deliver an
opinion on any mergers which the Bundeskartellamt wishes to forbid and which the Minister of the
Economy would like to consider for exemption. DUMEZ & JEUNEMAITRE, supra note 122, at 125-31.
137. See generally Josef Esser, Bank Power in West Germany, W. EUR. POL. Oct. 1990, at 17,
25 (1990); Mark Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10
(1991).
138. Kenneth Dyson, Economic Policy, in DEVELOPMENTS IN WEST GERMAN POLITics 148, 166
(Gordon Smith et al. eds., 1989).
139. MONOPOLIES COMMISSION, THE FIRST BIENNIAL REPORT BY THE MONOPOLIES COMMISSION
(1977).
140. Esser, supra note 137, at 25.
141. MONOPOLIES COMMISSION, EIGHTH BIENNIAL REPORT BY THE MONOPOLIES COMMISSION
(1988-89).
142. SMITH, supra note 131, at 287.
143. Jonathan Carr, Coming Together, ECONOMIST, Feb. 26, 1977, at 29.
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law creating the Bundeskartellant1" stressed the need to preserve competi-
tion, the German Parliament deliberately omitted merger control from the
Bundeskartellamt's purview.145 In addition, the 1958 law was weak in other
respects. For example, it prohibited cartels, while allowing retail price
maintenance.1 46 Crucially, it allowed the Economics Ministry to override the
Bundeskartellamt for reasons of "overall economic advantages" or "overriding
public interest." 47
A 1965 modification of the law changed little. 148 In 1973, however, a
Socialist-Free Democrat coalition sponsored reforms that established the
Monopolies Commission to publish opinions on concentrations.' 49 Most
importantly, the amendments gave the Bundeskartellamt control over any
acquisition of a firm with gross revenue greater than fifty million DM. More
recent reforms have lowered that threshold. 5 These 1973 reforms espoused
strict competition criteria and required the Bundeskartellamt to prohibit any
concentration that would "result in or strengthen a position of market
domination" unless the "participating enterprises prove that the merger will
result in improvements of competitive conditions."'' In addition, the
reforms made pre-merger notification obligatory in some cases. 15 2 Nonethe-
less, the reforms left final control over mergers with the Minister of
Economics, who remained free to override a Bundeskartellamt prohibition for
reasons of "economic advantages" or "overriding public interest."'15 3
Of the 582 mergers that came before the Bundeskartellamt between 1973
and 1975, the agency banned only four.'54 These feeble antitrust efforts
were too few and too late to prevent the sharp increase in concentration from
the 1950s through the 1970s. 55 Even the controversial Free Democrat party
chief, Otto von Lambsdorff, a perpetual public critic of Germany's powerful
bank-industrial complex, approved several major mergers over Bundes-
kartellamt opposition while serving as Economics Minister in the mid-
1970s.' 56 By the late 1970s, the Bundeskartellamt and the Social Democrats
144. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrdnkungen, Neufassung Sept. 24, 1980, BGBI.1 1761, § 24,
paras. 3-5 [hereinafter GWB].
145. MERGER CONTROL, supra note 33, at 51; see also SMITH, supra note 131, at 271-72. At least
one scholar has suggested that the Parliament did this specifically to allow the three largest banks,
broken up by Allied forces following the war, to regroup. DUMEZ & JEUNEMAITRE, supra note 122,
at 226-27.
146. SMITH, supra note 131, at 271-72.
147. GWB, supra note 144, at § 24, paras. 3-5.
148. SMITH, supra note 131, at 272.
149. Id.
150. Colin Jones, The GKN-Sachs Case: A Bouquet ofBarbed-Wire for Euro-mergers, FIN. TIMEs,
Feb. 23, 1978, at 22; see also SMITH, supra note 131, at 278.
151. MERGER CONTROL, supra note 33, at 69.
152. Id.
153. GWB, supra note 147, § 24, paras. 3-5.
154. A.H. Herrmann, Mergers: Why Governments Are Thinking Again, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1977
at 18.
155. See supra notes 139-143 and accompanying text.
156. SMITH, supra note 131, at 279; see also West German Oil: Forever Different, ECONOMIST,
Mar. 10, 1979, at 84.
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called for strict antitrust enforcement against industrial "elephants," '57 while
small and mid-size firms requested protection against takeovers." As a
result, Parliament lowered the thresholds for Bundeskartellamt control again
in 1980.159
This change did not stop debate on concentration law, however, particular-
ly when the mid-1980s merger boom brought concentration law again to the
fore. Several deals, such as Daimler-Benz's takeover of AEG, sparked debate
within Germany, and highlighted the role of the "big three" banks.' 60 Other
deals revealed that banks were helping clients evade the twenty-five percent
share limit over which the Bundeskartellamt may investigate planned
concentrations.' 6' For example, the Big Three often pooled their shares with
corporations, which enabled the firms to buy 24.95 percent of target
companies, thereby avoiding Bundeskartellamt scrutiny while retaining control
thanks to bank acquiescence.' 62
Throughout the 1980s, the Liberal Party called publicly for new limits on
the banks. Ironically, however, Liberal Minister of Economics Martin
Bangemann became the mastermind of the most controversial merger in
post-war Germany - Daimler-Benz's acquisition of MBB. MBB owned a
37.9% stake in Airbus, the European airline consortium that receives
significant German government subsidies. When Bangemann proposed the
merger in late 1987, he claimed that hooking MBB up with a cash rich firm
such as Daimler would help wean Airbus from its dependence on the public
fisC. 6 3 Overall, he painted the deal in economically liberal colors, claiming
it marked an advance towards the principle of privatization in Germany. 1 4
However, the Bundeskartellamt and other critics never believed Bangemann's
liberal explanations. They thought the deal proved Bangemann and elements
in his ministry, with backing from big banks and industry, favored an activist
industrial policy that formed national giants. 161 In the opinion of one
German official, "Bangemann was never a close friend of competition." 66
In the spring of 1987 Deutschebank's chief, Alfred Herrhausen, used the
bank's twenty-eight percent share in Daimler to force out Daimler's president
157. Bill Paul, Bonn's Antitrust Agency Fights Bigness, But Actual Breakup of Firms is Doubted,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 1979, at 46.
158. Herrmann, supra note 154.
159. MERGER CONTROL, supra note 33, at 5-12.
160. John Davies, Bonn Merger Law Review Sought, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1986, available in
LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file (discussing debate in Germany); see also Jonathan Carr, Daimler
Assured ofMajority inAEG, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni file
(discussing role of banks).
161. Peter Bruce, The Political Pressures Are Starting To Tell; West Germany's Banks, FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 8, 1987, at 22.
162. This was how MBB took over Krauss-Maffei. Id.
163. Love Among the Elephants, ECON., Sept. 16, 1989, at 13; see also Daimler and MBB:
Indigestion, ECONOMIST, Sept. 16, 1989, at 72.
164. David Marsh, Bonn Cabinet Clears The Runway For Daimler-MBB Take-Off, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 3, 1988, at 12.
165. Interview with a senior official of the Bundeskartellamt responsible European competition




and to install Edzard Renter. This move generated speculation that Reuter and
Herrhausen wanted to pursue Bangemann's suggestion to bid for MBB. 167
However, Reuter and Herrhausen first demanded government guarantees
against the possibility that Airbus might suffer losses from exchange-rate
fluctuations in the 1990s.'6 8
At the same time, critics expressed dismay about the "elephant mar-
riage." 69 The Defense Ministry opposed the merger on the grounds that the
new firm would receive forty percent of Germany's defense spending. 0
I.G.-Metall, Germany's influential metal workers union, also objected; it was
struggling with Daimler over work schedules and pay and feared any
strengthening of Daimler's industrial clout. 7 ' Social Democrats lambasted
the proposal because it would strengthen the "military-industrial com-
plex. "172 Wolfgang Kartte, the Bundeskartellamt chief, called the proposed
merger "idiotic."' 73 In the end, however, Helmut Haussmann, the Econom-
ics Minister who replaced Bangemann, approved the merger in the autumn of
1989, only weeks before Germany announced its support for the new EC
merger regulation. 74 Before the deal received final approval, Bangemann
went to Brussels in the winter of 1988-89 to become EC Commissioner of
Industry. His appointment, particularly in light of his support for the Daimler-
MBB merger, caused deep fears in the Bundeskartellamt that he would bring
industrial policy leanings to the European Community.' 7
This domestic debate reveals an ambivalence between competition and
industrial policy that contrasts sharply with Germany's unequivocal profession
of preference for an EC-wide antitrust control based exclusively on economic
criteria. The incident clouds the externally-directed rhetoric of an ideological
commitment to strict competition policy. It suggests that Germany's position
on European Community merger control was the result of significant
considerations of realpolitik, rather than ideological proselytization. To begin
with, Germany made no tremendous sacrifice in advocating merger control for
the European Community. Since the 1989 thresholds for Commission control
were set twenty-five times higher than under the 1973 proposal, and since the
1989 proposal excluded companies with a large proportion of their gross
revenue in a single state, the 1989 Regulation would barely touch Germany.
Thus, the practical effect of the proposal would be slight, especially compared
167. Haig Simonian, Benz Executive Steps Down Prematurely, FIN. TimEs, July 14, 1987, at II.
168. David Marsh, West Germany's New Military Giant, FIN. TIMEs, July 13, 1988, at 122.
169. David Marsh, West Germany 3: The Watchdog, FIN. TIMEs, Oct. 28, 1987, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Financial Times File.
170. Marsh, supra note 168, at 122.
171. West Germany: Trade Union Objects To Reorganisation ofMBB, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE
ZErrUNG, July 12, 1988, at P14.
172. West Germany: Opposition to Daimler Benz/MBB Deal, HANDELSBLATT, July 13, 1988, at
P1.
173. Marsh, supra note 169.
174. The announcement prompted Monopoly Commission director Ulrich Immenga, who had
attacked the proposal, to resign. David Marsh, Monopolies Panel Chief Quits Over MBB Merger, FIN.
TIMEs, Aug. 3, 1989, at 2.
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to the major political gains advocacy offered. 76 Domestically, support for
EC merger control enabled the brokers of the MBB-Daimler deal to reassure
the Bundeskartellamt that they had not lost sight of the virtue of competi-
tion."7 Internationally, support for the Regulation enabled Germany to
demonstrate to its neighbors a willingness to be "bound" by the European
Community. 17' Germany hoped to win British, French, and American trust
in the face of impending re-unification by supporting a panoply of EC
agreements. Supporting the merger control agreement helped Germany to
advance this goal.
B. France
Through much of its history, France has pursued a dirigiste economic
policy, in which the state plays an active role in the management of industry
and finance. 179 Governments on both the right and the left have used the
Ministry of Economics and Finance to pursue macroeconomic goals by
orchestrating nationalizations, state control of raw materials, price controls,
state control of bond and stock issues, and government-channelled
finance.' A lack of formalized administrative procedures or criteria for
merger controls marked the French interventionist tradition. Until the late
1970s, no clear criteria existed for evaluating proposed mergers. The French
stock market, underdeveloped in comparison with those of other industrialized
nations, was barely a factor in industrial activity until the securities reforms
of the mid-1980s. 181
The French National Assembly first passed legislation on merger control
on July 19, 1977.182 The act declared that mergers were not harmful a
priori; only mergers that might hinder "sufficient" competition without
bringing countervailing economic advantages were subject to the statute. 183
The law stated that the Minister of Economics and Finance could call on the
Commission de la Concurrence (competition commission) to advise him on a
merger's effects on competition or other economic issues. The Minister had
wide latitude to ignore or modify the Commission's report. 184 From 1977
176. See infra note 366 and accompanying text.
177. See infra note 291 and accompanying text.
178. See Pohl Throws a Gauntlet, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1990, at 16 (Germany as husband with
"new mistresses in the east" must "prove his love" for his "jealous wife," France, by giving her EC
conferences on economic and monetary union); Peter Ludlow, Europe's Institutions, Europe's Politics,
in THE SHAPE OF THE NEW EUROPE 59, 74 (Gregory F. Treverton ed., 1992). Of course, Germany's
.encasement" within the European Community may, in the long run, enhance Germany's influence as
much as it limits it. See, e.g., Institutional Change, supra note 15, at 30-33.
179. See J.E.S. HAYWARD, GOVERNING FRANCE: THE ONE AND INDIVISIBLE REPUBLIC, 172 and
passim (1983); see also Peter A. Hall, The State and the Market, in DEVELOPMENTS IN FRENCH
POLITICS, 171, 171-173 (Peter A. Hall et al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter Hall, The State].
180. Hall, The State, supra note 179 at 172-83.
181. See generally Philip G. Cemy, The 'Little Big Bang'in Paris: Financial Market Deregulation
in a Dirigiste System, 17 EUR. J. POLrr. RES. 169 (1989).
182. Law No. 77-806, 1977 J.O. 3833 (July 20, 1977) (Fr.).
183. MERGER CONTROL, supra note 33, at 33.
184. Law No. 77-806, supra note 182, art. 8.
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to 1986, the Commission reviewed only eight mergers, and the Minister
prohibited only one - Ashland Chemical France's effort to take over
Cabot."8 5 In that instance the Conseil d'Etat, the supreme administrative
court to which all administrative decisions may be appealed, overturned the
Commission's prohibition."16
During the first years of Francois Mitterrand's presidency in the early
1980s, the Socialist government embarked on a restructuring of the French
economy. 87 The government lowered the minimum wage, hired 100,000
new workers, and cut the work week to thirty-nine hours. Most
controversially, the government nationalized forty-nine firms, and expanded
aid to French industry from thirty-five billion francs in 1981 to eighty-six
billion francs by 1985.8 By 1986 the state managed twenty-four percent of
France's employees and controlled thirty-two percent of France's sales, thirty
percent of its exports, and sixty percent of its annual investment in industry
'and energy." 9
President Mitterrand's policies, coupled with a poor global economic
climate, cast France into economic difficulties. 9 ' In 1983, the government
compromised its earlier ideology by encouraging market-led reform and a
scaling-back of industrial policy. At the same time, the government chose to
devalue the franc and remain within the European Monetary System, while
renewing support for political and economic integration within the European
Community.' 91
When Jacques Chirac's center-right coalition gained control of the national
assembly in 1986 it advocated industrial restructuring and a major privatiza-
tion program. Prime Minister Chirac pledged to make France a nation of
shareholders and property owners.' 92 However, Chirac's proposed reforms
did not get very far. The state sold only eight big corporations, three smaller
banks, and three small firms. 93 Investment groups, each composed of
approximately ten investors closely connected to French industrial and
185. MERGER CONTROL, supra note 33, at 33.
186. Id. at 42.
187. See generally WILLIAM J. ADAMS, RESTRUCTURING THE FRENCH ECONOMY (1989); Peter
A. Hall, The Evolution of Economic Policy under Mitterrand, in THE MITrERRAND EXPERIMENT:
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN MODERN FRANCE (Stanley Hoffman ed., 1987) [hereinafter, Hall,
Evolution].
188. Hall, The State, supra note 179, at 176-77.
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the Single European Act, in THE NEw EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 41, 51 (Robert Keohane et al. eds.,
1991).
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political leaders, bought one-quarter of the shares in those businesses.1 94
Moreover, despite its professed liberalism, the new government imposed new
restrictions on foreign purchases of French companies. 95 The merger
control law of 1986196 renamed the Commission de la concurrence the
Conseil de la concurrence, but little else changed. Discretion over mergers
remained in the hands of the Minister of Economics and Finance. 97 In fact,
the Conseil lost the Commission's authority to initiate investigations into
mergers sua sponte."98
The Socialists regained control of the National Assembly in 1988.
President Mitterrand halted the privatization process, but pledged not to
reverse the Chirac government's privatizations. 199 The theme of "neither-
nor," neither privatization nor nationalization, characterized the early part of
Francois Mitterrand's second seven-year term.2"° Socialist Prime Minister
Rocard trimmed French government spending and edged away from state-
directed industrial policy, but shifted activist industrial policy towards regional
management and aid to smaller and mid-sized companies.2"' Meanwhile,
many groups continued to exert pressure for activist central government
industrial and economic policies. The Chirac and Rocard governments had "by
no means . . . completely dismantled" the dirigiste apparatus. 02
As in the case of Germany, France's domestic policy drama confuses
rather than clarifies France's stated economic and political policy within the
European Community. The step back from state interventionism was
significant,2 3 but complex and ambivalent beneath the surface. France's
wavering between dirigisme and privatization paralleled its ambivalence
toward the European Community. President Mitterrand had been the first
major European leader to turn decisively towards Euro-patriotism, calling in
1984 for a European relaunch based on a single market and progress towards
federalism. 2" When the time came to discuss specific actions such as
merger control, however, support among some political and private interest
groups within France withered. They remained reluctant to grant Brussels
authority and to relinquish national discretion. 05 Moreover, despite France's
apparent adoption of free-market ideology, it did not fully abandon the
tradition of activist industrial policy; it sought instead to retain an opening for
industrial policy in any EC merger control text.2'
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While post-war British governments have been largely wary of industrial
policy, the British have made some efforts to manage industry.2 7 The
immediate post-war Labor government nationalized some key sectors, such as
electricity, gas, mail services, telecommunications, and water, and gave
Britain one of Europe's largest public enterprise sectors.2"8 Between 1971
and 1979, the government spent £9.29 billion on private sector subsidies, an
amount that rivals France and Germany in terms of percentage of gross
domestic product.' ° In addition, since under Great Britain's competition
policy authorities examine whether mergers are broadly in the "public
interest," rather than merely anti-competitive,2 0 governments can use
merger control to protect or further social or industrial policy goals when
necessary.
Britain's competition bureaucracy has grown over time. A Labor
government created Britain's Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commis-
sion in 1948.2" Its members come from management, unions, the profes-
sions, and a staff of civil servants. The 1965 Monopolies and Mergers Act
added to the system when it authorized a Board of Trade (predecessor of the
Department of Trade and Industry) to refer mergers to the Commission for
consideration. In 1973 Parliament passed the 1973 Fair Trading Act
which placed all acquisitions worth more than £5 million and all mergers
yielding a combined market share of twenty-five percent or more under
government control.213 The Act also established the Office of Fair Trading
(OFT) to screen all mergers, and to advise the Secretary of State for Trade
and Industry whether to refer particular mergers to the Commission (renamed
the Monopolies and Mergers Commission). 24 The Secretary of State has the
authority to accept or reject the Commission's recommendations.2"5
One major problem with these merger policies was that ministerial
decisions were inconsistent. The relative importance that the Monopolies and
Mergers Commission and Secretary of State attached to competitiveness,
productivity, financing, social goals, employment, and regional factors (all
elements that they could consider) varied from case to case.. Political pressure
contributed to the fluctuation, as did behind-the-scenes lobbying by industry,
207. See PETER HALL, GOVERNING THE ECONOMY 65-68 (1986).
208. David Heald, The United Kingdom: Privatisation and Its Political Context, W. EURO. POL.,
Oct. 1989, at 31, 36.
209. HALL, GOVERNING THE ECONOMY, supra note 207, at 52.
210. Fair Trading Act, 1973, ch. 41, § 69(4) (Eng.), reprinted in 47 HALSBURY'S STAT. 125, 182
(4th ed. 1988).
211. Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act of 1948, § 1, reprinted in
[1948] 45 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY STATUTES 1617, 1618 (1950).
212. Monopolies and Mergers Act of 1965, ch. 50, sec. 6, reprinted in [1965] 63 THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY STATUTES, at 1691, 1701 (1966).
213. Fair Trading Act, supra note 210, at 177-78.
214. Id. at 128-30, 131-32, 187.
215. Id. at 184.
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labor, and other special interest groups.2 16 In 1977 the Labor government's
Secretary of Prices and Consumer Protection reviewed Britain's merger-
control process but changed little.1 7 Industrialists and trade unions opposed
reform."'
When the Tories came to power in 1979, they inherited a highly
discretionary merger control procedure that prior governments had used as a
tool for accomplishing regional and social goals. Gordon Borrie, the new
Director General of Fair Trading, began to examine mergers more closely for
anti-competitive effects. In 1981 he recommended that a record number of
mergers be sent to the Commission for evaluation. He took a particularly dim
view of conglomerate mergers between two firms that did not compete in the
same markets, even though the fusions did not increase market share, if the
merger gave the new conglomerate greater resources with which to fight off
potential market entrants.2
Despite the new vigilance, however, the criteria by which the Mergers
and Monopolies Commission and the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry
evaluated pending mergers and acquisitions remained unclear. The Secretary
of State for Trade and Industry overruled Commission and OTF recommenda-
tions for several mergers, including Woolworth's bid for Dodge City, the
battle for Sotheby's, and a number of mergers involving foreign firms. 2
0
The Secretary justified seemingly inconsistent decisions by citing the need to
protect national firms, 22' or to accomplish regional development and
employment goals. 2  In December 1981, the Commission rejected Sunny
Rowland's bid for the House of Fraser, which owned Harrod's Department
Store, not on competition grounds, but because the Commission did not
consider Rowland's management team competent.22
The Thatcher government responded to criticism of the Commission by
trying to better define the Commission's purpose. Parliament also raised the
threshold above which the government might intervene in mergers to £15
million in 1980 and £30 million in 1984, reflecting a Thatcherite belief that
industries should have leeway to restructure. 24 In July 1984, Norman
Tebbit, the new Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, pledged that
216. A Discipline for Merger Control, FIN. TIMES, May 18, 1982, at 18 ("the more noise
opponents of a merger make, the more likely it is that it will be referred to the Commission").
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220. Id.; see also Hazel Duffy, Why Britain Blocked Enserch, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1981, at 24.
221. For example, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation's bid for the Royal Bank
of Scotland Group Limited was referred by the Secretary to the MMC for consideration because of
anxiety over a takeover of a Scottish institution by a foreign entity. MERGER CONTROL, supra note 33,
at 195.
222. For example, the MMC recommended prohibiting Charter Consolidated PLC's proposed
merger with Anderson Strathcylyde PLC to protect employment in certain depressed regions where the
merged firms might lay-off workers. Id. at 207.
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competition would henceforth be the Commission's main criterion for
evaluating mergers.2
Tebbit at least partially fulfilled his pledge. For examplej in contrast to its
handling of Sunny Rowland's bid four years earlier, the Office of the
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry did not refer foreign firm
AI-Fayed's bid for Fraser to the Commission, despite the suitor's newness to
British industrial circlesY 6 In addition, the Commission evaluated GEC's
major 1986 bid for Plessey solely on competitiveness grounds. 7
On the other hand, by late 1985 giants like Distillers, Allied-Lyons, and
Plessey were all under hostile-takeover siege," 8 and neither targets nor
suitors could look to the merger control regime for a clear statement of their
respective rights. When Elders of Austria sought to take over Allied-Lyons
for £1.2 billion in 1985, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry referred
the bid to the Commission, not because of fears of anti-competitive effects,
but because of doubts about the deal's financing. 9 By this time Britain, like
much of the rest of the world, was experiencing a merger boom. In the first
nine months of 1986 firms spent £6.1 billion to buy other firms, compared to
£5.5 billion in all of 1985." ° This activity reaffirmed interest in using
criteria other than competition to evaluate mergers so as to further particular
players' goals.
As the boom continued, the Labor Party began to rail against the financial
feeding frenzy. Its platform pledged to place new restrictions on mergers, and
to shift the burden of proving that mergers would provide industrial and
economic benefits to would-be acquirors." 1 Despite this opposition, the
Thatcher government held fast to its system. 2 When the Swiss firm Nestle
made a bid for Rowntree in the spring of 1988, even prominent Tories (most
notably Michael Heseltine) called for the deal to be vetoed. 3 Disregarding
this criticism from within its ranks, the government declared that the bid
posed no danger to competition and that any attempt to block it might draw
foreign government retaliation against British bidders for foreign firms. 4
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available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Financial Times File [hereinafter Batchelor, Establishing].
229. Charles Batchelor, Distillers Hits atArgyll's Use of Political Advisers, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 24,
1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Financial Times File.
230. Batchelor, Establishing, supra note 228.
231. Weighing Up The Case For Shifiing The Burden OfProof, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1987, at 17.
232. A Merger Policy For The 1970s, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1988, at 14.
233. Peter Riddell, Tories Push Case for Chocolate Makers, FIN. TIMES, May 6, 1988, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Financial Times File.
234. Nikki Tait, Lord Young Defends Merger Policy, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1988, at 26; David
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Nevertheless, the government could not ignore mounting anxieties over
foreign takeovers of British firms, especially since they were coupled with
complaints about foreign barriers to British acquisitions abroad. In 1988-89,
Rowntree, Jaguar, Intercontinental Hotels, Pearl Group, Metal Box, and DRG
were among the British firms acquired by overseas owners. British industry
demanded that the government pressure continental states to "level the playing
field" and eliminate their barriers to acquisitions' s or erect such barriers in
Great Britain. British barriers might discriminate against countries deemed
protectionist or protect British firms from all foreign predators. Domestic
merger regulation could establish either type of barrier. 6 Banking interests,
eager to continue their role in the takeover activity, disagreed with industry's
position and lobbied against any such measures. 37
Thus, even the Thatcher government did not fully purge social, regional,
and industrial policy considerations from British merger control. British
negotiators were among the very last to accept the basic concept of any EC
control over mergers." Publicly, they attributed their resistance to a
concern that Brussels would place too much weight on industrial policy and
too little weight on competition. As in Germany and France, however, in
Britain too there was a deep appreciation for the diversity of domestic
interests that would be affected by merger control decisions. Throughout the
EC negotiations, this appreciation counseled the British to resist a common
regime.
VI. REBIRTH OF THE MERGER TALKS
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, disagreement among the three
major EC powers on economic principles does not fully explain why talks on
an EC merger regulation remained stalled throughout the 1980s. Both the
British government after Margaret Thatcher's election and the French
government after the policy turnabout of 1983 embraced more market-oriented
approaches. 9 However, merger talks remained mired because the key
governments were entangled in domestic political webs that sometimes pulled
Waller, Decision Reaffirms Merger Policy Stance, FIN. TIMEs, May 26, 1988, at 28; A Europe-Wide
Mergers Policy, FIN. TIMES, May 26, 1988, at 26; Peter Riddell, Ministers Defend Takeover Policy,
FIN. TIMES, May 26, 1988, at 1.
235. Pledges by the EC Commission to "level the playing field" by attempting to remove barriers
to takeovers in continental states may have been one of a number of quid pro quos offered to Great
Britain in 1989 to win British support for the EC merger regulation. See infra notes 299-310 and
accompanying text.
236. Hazel Duffy, Banham to Callfor CBlAction on Hostile Foreign Takeovers, FIN. TIMES, Feb.
22, 1989, at 8. The argument that governments were using domestic merger control to block foreign
acquisition of domestic firms played a role in domestic debates on the value of EC-wide merger
controls. See infra notes 298-302 and accompanying text.
237. In the late 1980s, four-fifths of all contested EC stock market takeovers took place in the
U.K. As a result, British banks profited considerably. David Buchan & William Dawkins, EC States
Set for Advance on Vetting of Cross-Border Mergers, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1989, at 6.
238. Jacques Docquiert, Contr6le des Concentrations d'Entreprises: Tbnides Progr&s des Douze,
LES ECHOS, Nov. 21, 1988.
239. Sandholtz & Zysman, supra note 124, at 111-13.
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them in directions inconsistent with their purported ideologies. Rhetoric
notwithstanding, each member government grasped the importance of merger
control as a tool for intervening in their domestic economies. Circumstance
had not yet created a coincidence of national self-interest that would facilitate
consigning merger control to Brussels. In the negotiations on merger control
this divergence of national interests took the form of highly complex and
politicized strategic calculations by each member state. 24
The merger regulation the member states finally adopted in autumn 1989
was a legal hodgepodge.24' Negotiators set disagreement aside to come up
with a document at all costs. The merger control regulation that resulted was
a jumble of symbolic gestures pushed through in the late. 1980s to give
credence to the EC's relaunch, particularly in the shadow of Germany's
imminent reunification. The document constrained as much as it empowered
the Commission.
A. European Community Relaunch
In 1985 Lord Cockfield, the Vice President of the European Commission,
presented a White Paper calling for the elimination of barriers to trade within
the Community. That White Paper formed the basis for the Single European
Act, which the member states signed in February 1986.242 The publicly
proclaimed premise of the single market project was economically liberal:
only a large common market would enable EC firms to compete efficiently
with American and Japanese companies.
Against this backdrop, Commissioner Peter Sutherland, responsible for
Director Generalate IV (DG IV), the section of the Commission responsible
for competition, renewed the call for tough Community control over mergers
and greater power for the Commission. Dubbed the "little Sheriff" by EC
Commission President Jacques Delors, Sutherland used a combination of
carrots and sticks alternatively to lure and bully the Council. Sutherland stated
that he approved of mergers needed to "improve the competitive structure" of
Europe, and claimed that he had no intention of overruling member states'
policies.243 However, he also threatened that the Commission would turn to
case law to develop merger control if the Council did not adopt a regula-
tion.244
240. On the 1992 project as a "hierarchy of bargains," see id. at 100.
241. See infra notes 343-390 and accompanying text.
242. For a discussion of the range of political considerations that led the chief EC member states
to sign the Single European Act and support the EC revival that followed, see Moravcsik, supra note
204, at 50-53.
243. Peter D. Sutherland, Address to the Merger in the EEC Colloquium (Mar. 11, 1988)
[hereinafter Sutherland Address].
244. Concurrence: La Commission Demande que le Conseil "Marche Interieur" S'engage aAdopter
Avant lafin de 1988 la Directive sur le Controle des Concentrations, EUROPE, Nov. 28, 1987, at 9,
9; see also MERGER CONTROL, supra note 33, at 285-87 (citing four Sutherland speeches).
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B. BAT & RJ Reynolds: Article 85 Resurrected
Sutherland received a dramatic boost for his campaign in November
1987.245 In an entirely unexpected move, the European Court of Justice
strongly implied in BAT & RJ Reynolds Industries v. Commission 46 that
Article 85 - moribund as to mergers since the 1966 memorandum247 -
might be revived as a source of Commission authority.
The activities that preceded this case were as follows. A South African
company, the Rembrandt Group Ltd (Rembrandt), owned all of Rothmans
Tobacco (Holding) Ltd (RTH). RTH in turn had a controlling interest in
Rothmans International (RI). In April 1981 the American cigarette concern
Philip Morris, Inc. purchased fifty percent of Rembrandt's equity in RTH.
Philip Morris and Rembrandt then agreed that they would jointly manage RI.
Philip Morris and Rembrandt feared that the transaction might be an illegal
agreement restricting competition under Article 85; therefore, they notified the
Commission of their deal according to the provisions of Regulation 17,
perhaps hoping to qualify for an exemption under Article 85(3), the Treaty
clause permitting agreements that yield distributional, economic, or technical
benefits. A rival American company, RJ Reynolds (joined later by the British
American Tobacco Company (BAT)) complained to the Commission about the
agreement, claiming that it would allow Philip Morris to influence RI's
market behavior and thereby distort competition in violation of Article 85.
The Commission agreed with RJ Reynolds' complaint and threatened
Rembrandt and Philip Morris with an injunction under Article 85. Rembrandt
and Philip Morris then began negotiations with the Commission. In 1984, they
agreed that Philip Morris would give up its fifty percent stake in RTH and
would take only a 30.8 percent direct stake in RI, limiting its voting rights to
24.9 percent of voting equity. This, they argued, would leave Rembrandt in
essential control of RI through RTH, which would control 43.6 percent of
RI's voting rights. Other terms designed to ensure that Philip Morris would
not influence RI also were written into the pact, including clauses to keep
Philip Morris completely out of RI management and to ensure that Philip
Morris would receive no inside information about RI's behavior. The
companies also settled on terms giving Rembrandt and Philip Morris certain
rights of first refusal if either were to dispose of its shares. These additional
terms included future adjustments in voting rights.
The Commission concluded that the final package did not violate Article
85(1) and approved it. The two competing tobacco companies, RJ Reynolds
and BAT, protested. They claimed that the share disposal and voting rights
terms of the accord would allow Philip Morris to scare off potential RI suitors
and give Philip Morris powerful leverage over RI. RJ Reynolds and BAT also
245. Sophie G~rondeau & Antoine Winckler, Etude Critique de Rfglement CEE sur le Contrdle
des Concentrations d'Entreprises, REVUE DU MARCH9 COMMON, Aug.-Sept. 1990, 541,547; Heinrich
Holzer, Merger Control, in EUROPEAN COMPETrrION POLICY 9, 12-13 (Peter Montagnon ed., 1990).
246. 1987 E.C.R. 4487.
247. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
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argued that Philip Morris might seek to control RI in the future. Unable to
convince the Commission to reverse its ruling, RI Reynolds and BAT applied
to the Court to have the Commission's decision overturned.
As in Continental Can, the Court ruled in favor of the corporation whose
transaction was being challenged, and rejected RJ Reynolds and BAT's
complaint of a violation of Article 85(1). The Court ruled that the plaintiffs
had failed to prove that the Commission had made any "manifest error" in its
consideration of the competitive effects of the transactions. 2 ' Also as in
Continental Can the Court used this case as a platform from which to test
potentially explosive dicta. Unlike the situation in Continental Can, however,
the Commission's brief in BAT did not ask for a departure from accepted
interpretation of Treaty powers.
The Court could have evaluated the Treaty status of the agreement
between the firms narrowly, as an acquisition of a minority shareholding,
without extending its analysis to the issue of concentrations.249 The Court
also could have categorized the transaction as one that gave one company
control of another, thus clearly enabling it to extend its analysis to concentra-
tions. However, the Court's opinion was written ambiguously enough to
support either a restrictive or an expansive reading of Article 85.' ° Those
who believe that the Court found a heretofore unrecognized, broad scope for
Article 85 observe that the Court included amongst agreements "prohibited by
Article 85" instances "where, by the acquisition of a shareholding or through
subsidiary clauses in the agreement, the investing company obtains legal or
de facto control of the commercial conduct of the other company
The Court also prohibited any
agreement [that] gives the investing company the possibility of reinforcing its position at a
later stage and taking effective control of the other company. Account must be taken not only
of the immediate effects of the agreement but also of its potential effects and of the possibility
that the agreement may be part of a long-term plan."
Later in its opinion, the Court stressed that in "[oligopolistic and stagnant]
markets any attempted takeover . . . is liable to result in restriction of
competition" and therefore is likely to violate Article 85." The next
paragraph specifically affirmed the Commission's authority to consider
whether "an agreement which at first sight provides only for a passive
investment in a competitor is not in fact intended to result in a takeover" in
determining whether a passive investor has violated Article 85."
By stressing a test of "legal or de facto control" and signalling an
understanding of the Commission's authority to consider whether potential
takeovers infringe Article 85, the Court came extremely close to declaring that
248. 1987 E.C.R. at 4509-44.
249. See MERGER CONTROL, supra note 33, at 274; see also Bos, supra note 24, at 75.
250. Bos, supra note 24, at 70 n.3 (listing authorities who interpret ruling expansively).
251. 1987 E.C.R. at 4577.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 578.
254. Id.
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Article 85 covers mergers and acquisitions. 5 Since this expansive reading
of Article 85 was not necessary to decide the case, the dicta may have been
the Court's way of testing the political waters, as it had done in Continental
Can. That the Court's pronouncements on Article 85 were not clear further
suggests this possibility. In particular, the Court's vagueness suggests
uncertainty as to how institutional and political actors would receive the
Court's interpretation. Thus the Court included escape clauses in the opinion




The Court also laced its opinion with passages that could be read as
narrowing its interpretation of the applicability of Article 85. The Court
characterized the issue before it as
whether and in what circumstances the acquisition of a minority shareholding in a competing
company may constitute an infringement of articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty. Since the
acquisition of shares in Rothmans International was the subject-matter of agreements entered
into by companies which have remained independent after the entry into force of the
agreements, the issue must be examined first of all from the point of view of article 85y,
This passage suggests that one should apply the holding only to acquisitions
of minority shareholdings; Article 85 applies, the Court said, only because the
agreements at issue were "entered into by companies which have remained
independent. "" If one of the parties to the agreement were to lose its
independence - in other words, if a true merger or acquisition were to
occur - Article 85 might not apply. 9 Finally, the mention of "competing
companies" suggests that even if mergers were brought under Article 85, the
holding might not reach vertical and conglomerate mergers.26O
The BAT ruling spawned strong legal debate. Some analysts declared that
it "radically revised" the application of Article 85 to mergers. Others
dismissed it as "far less revolutionary than some may pretend," citing the
limiting language.262
In any case, the decision offered Peter Sutherland a powerful stick with
which to expand the Commission's authority over mergers. Soon after the
judgment, he threatened to exercise Commission authority to win changes to
a number of proposed concentrations.263 In early 1988, British Airways and
British Caledonian agreed to Sutherland's demand that they change the terms
255. See DowNES, supra note 34, at 24; MERGER CONTROLS, supra note 33, at 274; A.H.
Hermann, Brussel's Dream of Merger Control, FIN. TIMEs, Nov. 24, 1987, at 18; see also Frank L.
Fine, The Philip Morris Judgment: Does Article 85 Now Extend To Mergers?, 8 EuR. COMPETrrION
L. REV. 333 (1987).
256. DOWNES, supra note 34, at 21.
257. 1987 E.C.R. at 4575.
258. Id.
259. Bos, supra note 24, at 77-78; see also DOWNES, supra note 34, at 21-22.
260. DOWNES, supra note 34, at 21-22.
261. Id. at 14; see also Bos, supra note 24, at 70 n.3 (citing articles in debate over case).
262. VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 83, at 303.
263. Controle des Fusions: Vers un Nouveau Reglement CEE, EUROPOLITIQUE, Mar. 5, 1988
[hereinafter Controle des Fusions].
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of their merger, even though British merger authorities had approved the
deal.264 That year the Commission also prevented BC&C, a holding compa-
ny formed by a British consortium of three beverage producers, from taking
over Irish Distillers Group (IDG) after IDG complained that the holding
company had been formed specifically to prevent more competitive bids.26
The BAT ruling, coupled with these Commission victories, fueled
industry's requests for clarification of the Commission's and member states'
jurisdiction and the substantive standards each would apply to future merger
control. 266
C. Negotiations Resume
In spring 1988, Commissioner Sutherland presented yet another draft
merger control regulation for Council consideration. 267 The 1988 draft
would ban any concentration that created or reinforced a dominant posi-
tion.268 The draft defined "concentration" as a transaction whereby a person
or an undertaking acquires control of other undertakings, and defined
"control" as "rights or contracts which ... make it possible to determine how
an undertaking shall operate. "269 Under this definition of control the
Commission might consider transactions such as those covered by the German
law barring an attempt to acquire a share of twenty-five percent or more in
a target firm, or the French law barring an attempt to acquire a share of 33.3
percent or more in a target.270 However, the Regulation would cover only
mergers in which the aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings
concerned exceeded one billion ECUs271 - a threshold five times higher
than in the original 1973 draft. In addition, the acquired firm would have to
have a turnover of at least 50 million ECUs." If all the undertakings
effecting the concentration achieved more than three-quarters of aggregate
community-wide turnover in a single state, the concentration would be subject
to the merger authorities of that state exclusively.2 3 Finally, if the new firm
controlled a share of twenty percent or less of the relevant EC market, the
264. David Buchan & Michael Donne, BA Agrees to Concessions on Merger with BCal Over
European Routes, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1988, at 1.
265. William Dawkins & Lisa Wood, EC Forces Changes in Irish Bid Battle, FIN TIMES, Aug.
18, 1988, at 19.
266. William Dawkins, Competition Lawyers Strike A Bonanza in Brussels: The European Market,
FIN. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1988, at 4.
267. Sutherland Address, supra note 213, at 4; Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation on the
Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, COMMON MARKET LAW REPORTS ANTITRUST
SUPPLEMENT (1988), [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 472 [hereinafter 1988 Proposal].
268. 1988 Proposal, supra note 267, arts. 2(2), 8(2).
269. Id. art. 3(1) & (3).
270. Internal French Ministry of Finance reports on the negotiations made available to the author
by a former senior official in the Ministry who participated in the negotiations [hereinafter French
Ministry of Finance Reports].
271. 1988 Proposal, supra note 267, art. l(3)(a).
272. Id. art. 1(3)(b).
273. Id. art. 1(3)(c).
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merger would be per se permissible.274 The Commission pledged that no
more than two months would elapse from notification to the commencement
of proceedings,275 and four months from the commencement of proceedings
to a final decision. 76
The draft regulation contained important industrial policy caveats. The
Commission would consider factors other than mere dominance, including
"improving the production and distribution, . . . promoting technical or
economic progress, or . . . improving the competitive structure within the
Common Market."2' However, these criteria would be considered only
insofar as the merger did not block competition. The Commission also
promised that it would take account of "international competition . . . as well
as the interests of the consumers. "278 Finally, the Commission promised
"close and constant co-operation" with the authorities of the member
states.279 Nevertheless, final authority over concentrations would lie with the
Commission.2 0
Commissioner Sutherland estimated that had the Regulation been in force
in 1986 and 1987, the Commission would have had the power to examine
about 150 mergers during those years; the member states estimated that figure
as closer to 200.2"1 German and French firms would have been most
affected.2"2 According to one French estimate, eighty-five mergers involving
two or more firms all from the same state might have come under Brussels'
purview in 1987 had the proposed regulation been in force in that year,
because portions of the firms' sales occurred in other Community states.
23
In response to such state discomfort Commissioner Sutherland amended
the draft regulation further in July 1988, adding that dominance alone would
not constitute a per se violation of merger standards. Rather, the Commission
would have to prove that the proposed merger would harm the market.2"
274. Id. art. 2(3).
275. Id. art. 6(3).
276. Id. art. 19(1).
277. Id. art. 2(4).
278. Id.
279. Id. art. 18(3).
280. Id. art. 21 ("Subject to review by the Court of Justice, the Commission shall have sole
jurisdiction to take the decisions provided for in this regulation."); Une 6tape dcisive vers l'instauratlon
d'un systme de contrble des concentrations au niveau communautaire, COMMUNrrY INFORMATION
(Comm'n of the Eur. Communities), Mar. 2, 1988; see also William Dawkins, EC Faces Up to Merger
Worries As 1992 Beckons, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1988, at 3; Controle des Fusions, supra note 263.
281. French Ministry of Finance Reports, supra note 270.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Concurrence: La Commission Tente D'Amadouer Les Britanniques Avec Le Nouveau Projet
Sur Les Fusions, EUROPOLITIQUE, Sept. 10, 1988.
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D. The Member States React'8
In each of the three largest member states, contradictory demands from
competing domestic interest groups made it impossible for negotiators to come
up with a coherent normative vision of what European merger control should
be. Moreover, given the strong national interests in this area, the Commu-
nity's approach to merger control remained the approach of an international
organization, not that of a supranational entity that is capable of making and
enforcing broad-based policy determinations in the name of the public interest.
The authority the member states relegated to Brussels was as circumscribed
as possible. Control over most mergers remained in the hands of the member
state governments.
1. Germany
Germany's 1987 decision to support the principle of regulating cross-
border mergers286 provided a crucial impetus to Commissioner Sutherland's
campaign. Unlike their counterparts in other states, German officials
responsible for administering merger control urged that any European text
require the Commission to evaluate mergers exclusively on competition
grounds and not on industrial policy grounds.287
However, German officials differed in their motives for supporting a
document dedicated to pure competition. The Bundeskartellamt favored a strict
competition text for ideological reasons.288 Moreover, it did not trust
Brussels to enforce a competition policy free of any politicking - particularly
after Martin Bangemann, the German minister who had been responsible for
the MBB-Daimler Benz merger, 289 became the EC Commissioner of
Industrial Affairs .290 The Bundeskartellamt hoped that a strict text would
keep the Commission honest. Bangemann's former office, the Ministry of
Economics, also favored a strict text. However, Bundeskartellamt officials
believed that the Ministry's position stemmed from its association with
German industrialists who were complaining of the advantages enjoyed by
competitors in member states more lax in their antitrust enforcement. These
285. The following section on member state negotiating positions is based largely on interviews
with EC and national officials involved in the talks. These include the Schrtter Interview, supra note
101; an interview with a senior official with UNICE (the federation of EC industries), in Brussels (Mar.
19, 1991); an interview with a former senior official in the British Office of Fair Trading during the
negotiations, in London (Mar. 20, 1991) [hereinafter Interview with British Official]; the interview with
the Bundeskartellamt official, supra note 165; and an interview with a former senior official in the
French Ministry of Economics and Finance in charge of competition policy, who participated in the
development of the French position, in Paris (Mar. 27, 1991) [hereinafter Interview with French
Official].
286. STEPHEN WOOLCOCK, EUROPEAN MERGERS: NATIONAL OR COMMUNITY CONTROLS? 21
(1989).
287. AGENCE EUROPE, No. 4845, Sept. 5, 1988.
288. Interview with Bundeskartellamt official, supra note 165.
289. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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industrialists hoped that a European text would either force Bundeskartellamt-
like strictures on other European firms or allow German firms to share with
their competitors the benefits of more lax regulation.291
The perceived need to pacify German domestic opinion during and
following the MBB affair led German negotiators to adopt the Bundes-
kartellamt's position that competition should be the sole measure by which to
evaluate mergers. Under pressure from Wolfgang Kartte, head of the
Bundeskartellamt, Germany floated proposals for a two-step process. Under
the German proposal, an independent body similar to the Bundeskartellamt
would evaluate proposed mergers, and the Commission would then accept or
reject that body's recommendation. This procedure would force the Commis-
sion either to defend its decisions publicly or to acknowledge the political
constraints by which it was bound.292 Nonetheless, German negotiators also
urged that ultimate control over mergers remain in the hands of national
authorities who would have discretion to veto Commission approval on
competition grounds.293 German negotiators favored a text that would allow
the Commission to tolerate rather than to authorize mergers; in other words,
a text that would permit the Commission to provide negative clearance that
would not override national laws.294
Other member states, notably Great Britain, opposed Germany's demand
that domestic authorities retain ultimate control over mergers. In particular,
they noted that under German law, the Ministry of Economics may overrule
the Bundeskartellamt.29 They feared that if domestic authorities retained a
veto, the Ministry might permit a merger to further German interests even
when the Bundeskartellamt and Commission sought to prohibit the merger on
competition grounds.
2. Great Britain
Just as German negotiators looked to the Bundeskartellamt, British
negotiators looked to the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) to support pure
291. "The German firms always claimed they were handicapped, complaining about the strong
competition system in Germany," the Bundeskartellamt official told me during our interview.
"Volkswagen could never buy BMW, but Fiat could buy Alfa Romeo, or French and Italian firms could
merge. So German industries wished either to weaken the German position, or strengthen the
Commission's." Interview with Bundeskartellamt official, supra note 165.
292. Id.; see also Concurrence: Le Secrdtaire d'Etat Allemand Otto Schlecht Plaide Pour un
Systame CEE a Deux Etapes Pour le Contrdle des Fusions et un Parallelisme Entre Systhmes Europeens
et Nationaux au cours d'une Erape Interm6diaire, EUROPE, Sept. 5, 1988, at 14; Andrew Fischer,
Merger Policy Talks Please German Cartel-Busters, FiN. TIMEs, Jan. 9, 1989, at 3.
293. Interview with Bundeskartellamt official, supra note 165; see also David Buchan & Richard
Lambert, EC 'Making Progress' on Merger Control Powers, FIN. TIEs, Sept. 20, 1989, at 2; Conseil
Marchd Intdrieur: Les Reserves Allemandes, Britanniques et Frangais ont Empchd l'Adoption des
"Conclusions Rdvisdes" et M. Sutherland sur le Contrdle des Concentrations (Qui Sont Ndanmoins
Retenues Comme Base des Travaux Futurs), EUROPE, Dec. 23, 1988, at 5; Concurrence: Reglement sur
les Fusions: Prog&s sur des Ddtails Mais Pas des Points Cruciaux, EUROPOLrrIQUE, Feb. 8, 1989, at
3.
294. William Dawkins, The Dream Is Becoming Reality, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1988 at 20.
295. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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competition in a merger regulation.296 Deeply distrustful of what it per-
ceived as Brussels' industrial policy bent, the OFT lobbied hard for national
review.297 Unlike the German negotiators, however, the British negotiators
did not enjoy domestic bureaucratic support for a regime that would allow
national authorities to review Commission decisions. Some officials in
Britain's Department of Trade and Industry wanted to have the Commission
review almost all Community mergers, preempting continental national
authorities, in order to facilitate British firms' takeovers of continental
firms.29 These officials bitterly opposed the OFT-Bundeskartellamt goal of
retaining national authority over mergers, particularly because they suspected
that the German Ministry of Economics would use its final say over mergers
in Germany to advance German industry's aims and to block foreign
acquirors.299 As a quid pro quo for British support for common merger
control, the EC Commission proposed removing barriers to takeovers across
the continent.'°°
Not all officials in Britain's Department of Trade and Industry opposed
leaving the final word to national authorities. Some embraced this position
because they feared the consequences of foreign public firms buying British
private firms. However, these officials did not trust other states' commitments
to applying a pure competition standard; therefore, these officials suspected
any attempts by Germany, France, or other member states to have their
national authorities review Commission decisions.
Despite the general British opposition to national review, the British
negotiators proposed a clause that would allow national authorities to take
measures to protect "national public interests." '' Britain's difficulty in
forming a negotiating position therefore manifested the same restraints felt by
the other states. In short, there was no way for Great Britain to come up with
a regulation that would allow its own government to retain authority and
discretion while stripping others governments of theirs.
296. Interview with British Official, supra note 285; see also Philip Coggan, Getting Europe Ship-
Shape to Compete in World Markets, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1989, at 232.
297. "The moment the full horror of it struck was when it became apparent the Commission was
seeking a one-stop shop," said one Office of Fair Trading official. "That meant whatever objections
national authorities had, they would be powerless to oppose the Commission." Interview with British
Official, supra note 285.
298. Id. Seventy-three percent of European takeovers (by value) in 1988 were of British
companies. Of twenty-six hostile takeovers, twenty-three were in Great Britain, with only one each in
France, Italy, and the Netherlands. Lucy Kellaway, EC Commission Pledges Freer Regime on Corporate
Takeovers, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1989, at 1.
299. Interview with British Official, supra note 285. Bankers joined the group of Ministry officials
opposed to national review of Commission decisions. They saw British antitrust policy as one of the few
domestic hurdles to mergers, and hoped that transferring powers to Brussels might eliminate that
barrier.
300. See WOOLCOCK, supra note 286, at 36-37; see also Lucy Kellaway, Brussels Faces Uphill
Struggle to Remove Takeover Barriers, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1989, at 17 (noting British government
published list of barriers to takeovers, and EC Commission responded with list of proposed antidotes).
301. La Commission Tente D'Amadouer, supra note 284.
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3. France
Through most of the talks, French negotiators supported a loose text that
would allow firms to merge for industrial and technological reasons, even if
such mergers weakened competition. Several French policy interests
recommended maximizing Commission authority: desire to circumvent
antitrust authorities in foreign states, regulatory clarity, and the public image
of France as a strong supporter of the European Community. However, other
French policy interests suggested a more conservative position: protecting
French business from aggressive foreign investment and facilitating restructur-
ing by French firms.
These competing interests fostered a domestic French debate over France's
negotiating position that involved the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of
Economics and Finance, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (which sought
a symbolic victory in France's push for a strengthened European Community).
The fact that each ministry modified its own position mid-course further
complicated internal French discussions." °
Many officials in the Ministry of Economics and Finance did not want
Brussels to determine what was best for French industry. 3 Thus, when
talks on a merger regulation began again in late 1987, the Ministry supported
a transfer of power to Brussels qualified by national review, a position similar
to that espoused by the German Bundeskartellamt and the British OFT. The
Ministry of Industry suspected any EC regulation. It argued that authorizing
the Commission to control mergers would impede French firms' ability to
restructure3 and therefore shared the view that national governments
should retain a right to review Commission decisions. Industrial leaders also
opposed any a priori notification of the Commission, which would offend
French traditions of confidentiality. On the other hand, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs argued that it would be harmful for France to be seen as the
only power aside from Great Britain that opposed transferring merger control
authority to the Commission. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs thus pleaded for
all the other ministries to accept giving Brussels competence over merg-
ers.
30 5
The Socialists' national electoral success in May-June 1988 altered the
positions of the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Economics and
Finance. The former agency, which had supported a right of national review
before the election, decided after the election that any EC regulation should
maximize judicial clarity by assigning to the Commission the last word on all
decisions."' By contrast, the Ministry of Economics and Finance lobbied
302. French Ministry of Economics and Finance, chronological chart of positions advocated by
various French ministries throughout the negotiations (unpublished document, on file with author)
[hereinafter Chart].
303. Interview with French Official, supra note 285.
304. Chart, supra note 302.
305. Id.
306. Interview with French Official, supra note 285.
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even more strongly for preserving national control, and was prepared to ally
with the British and Germans to defend that position.
Several factors explain why the Ministry of Economics and Finance
continued to support this position. First, it continued to fear that proposed
turnover thresholds would allow the Commission to intervene unnecessarily
in local markets even when the effects of a merger would be felt primarily
within the region. 0 7 Second, ministry officials worried that the Commission
might make decisions without considering their inflationary effects.30 8 Since
France had just lifted price controls and was planning to strengthen its
prohibitions against cartelization and restraint of trade, this worry was
particularly acute.
Third, the Ministry of Economics and Finance believed that national
authority over competition was necessary to safeguard against foreign
investments and takeovers that might harm important state interests, including
the wish to develop domestic industrial giants.3" An internal Ministry study
argued that the potential harm from unrestrained German acquisitions in
France would outweigh potential benefits to French companies struggling to
overcome perceived antitrust hurdles to acquisitions in Germany. The report
asserted that the Bundeskartellamt had only blocked two French acquisitions
in Germany, with little sign of discriminatory treatment. It noted that German
investment in France overshadowed French investment in Germany by a ratio
of three to one and urged that industry's wish for judicial clarity take a back
seat to the French public interest and the need to maintain antitrust hurdles to
foreign acquirors.31o
Finally, the Ministry of Economics and Finance argued that any European
text would necessarily neglect French concerns about competition from outside
the European Community and about the importance of industrial policy.
Minister of Economics and Finance Pierre Beregovoy lobbied at one point to
have "total economic effect" enshrined in the Regulation as the criterion by
which proposed mergers would be evaluated.3" ' Yet he balked at the
prospect of allowing the Commission to make industrial policy decisions for
France. British and German firms were larger than French firms, wrote
Beregovoy in one confidential memo to then Minister for European Affairs,
Edith Cresson.312 "French industry is in a period of full restructuring," and
restraints must not be placed in its way.3"3 Like Great Britain, France faced
the paradox that there was no way to bind the others, notably Germany, by




310. French entities invested F647 million in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1987; Germans
invested three times as much in France in the same year. The study and inter-ministry memos sketching
arguments regarding the proposed merger regulation were made available by the former French Ministry




Schwartz EC Merger Control
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
4. The Final Negotiations
By late 1988, many national delegations realized that they would not be
able to produce a text for a merger regulation that would reconcile disagree-
ments with other member states -and competing internal demands. British
negotiators acknowledged that they might not get a pure competition text and
resigned themselves to the position that enabling British firms to circumvent
other states' merger regulations was less important than safeguarding their
own merger regulations. 114 The Germans had to concede that their two-step
proposal1 5 probably would not be accepted, but still had to satisfy the
Bundeskartellamt's insistence on retention of national authority. The French
were unable to develop a unified domestic position.
Unable to achieve consensus, but unwilling to walk away without at least
creating the impression that they had achieved something, the national
delegates began pushing for extremely high thresholds. They would produce
a regulation, but one that would conferjurisdiction on the Commission in only
the most extreme cases. The British and Germans sought a 10 billion ECU
hurdle,316 and the French articulated no formal position. Only the smaller
states, anxious to have the Commission regulate mergers that they lacked the
resources or political muscle to police, sought sharply lower thresholds. 7
In March 1989 Sir Leon Brittan of Great Britain, who had replaced
Sutherland as Commissioner in January, presented still another draft
regulation. This time the Commission proposed a jurisdictional threshold of
an EC-wide turnover of two billion ECUs, with a temporary threshold of five
billion ECUs until 1992.31' Merged entities that would generate at least two-
thirds of their revenue in a single state would be exempt, a reduction from
prior drafts' three-quarters hurdle.1 9 In an attempt to reconcile the interests
of clarity and simplicity with the interests of national particularism, Sir Leon
pledged that the Commission would not use Articles 85 or 86 after a merger
is completed and would restrict its evaluations to the criteria and thresholds
laid out in any new regulation.320 The Commission hoped that this pledge
would win over industries hoping for regulatory clarity and member states
worried about the Commission's accretion of power under Articles 85 and 86.
The Commission estimated that the new proposals, if adopted, would limit
314. Interview with British Official, supra note 285.
315. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
316. Conseil March Interieur, supra note 293, at 5.
317. Concurrence, Controle des Fusions: 11 Faut S'Attendre a des Rudes Negotiations Apres le
'Oul, Mai' des Douze, EUROPOLITIQUE, April 15, 1989, at 9; Guy de Jonquieres & Lucy Kellaway,
Two-Tier Merger Control Proposed for Community, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1989, at 2.
318. William Dawkins, EC Tones Down Proposals on Merger Control Policy, FIN. TIMES, Apr.
1, 1989, at 1.
319. Id.
320. Spokesman's Service, European Commission, Press Release No. IP (89) 200 (Mar. 31, 1989).
Whether this pledge is legally binding or permitted under the Treaty of Rome is debatable. See Infra
notes 375-388 and accompanying text.
650
Vol. 18:607, 1993
Commission competence to thirty or forty transactions per year, as opposed
to the estimated 150 transactions under previous versions.32'
Despite the new draft and Brittan's pledge, the member states remained
divided. The smaller countries, including the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland,
and Spain, continued their call for lower jurisdictional thresholds, at a
maximum of two billion ECU.3" France now lobbied for a "reciprocity"
clause that would ban acquisitions from non-EC states that used their own
merger laws against EC-based buyers. 3" In addition, French and Italian
negotiators continued to argue that industrial policy should be a factor in
decisions to allow or to prohibit particular mergers.324 Finally, the poorer
states now demanded that the Regulation protect "cohesion" (the need for
economic development) in the southern tier of the European Community.3"
In the autumn of 1989, the German Ministry of Economics approved the
MBB-Daimler merger over the objections of the Bundeskartellamt, and despite
the resignation of the director of the Monopolies Commission.326 The
decision provoked a domestic uproar,327 and the need to appease the Bundes-
kartellam ? 28 led German negotiators to demand openly that their national
authorities be given a final right to block Commission-approved mergers. 329
Finally, Britain, swayed by OFT arguments, asserted that it would allow
a single EC regime to supplant diverse national merger regimes only if the
Regulation incorporated pure competition criteria.33' Their commitment to
a single regime notwithstanding, the British called for a "public interest"
clause similar to their own rules allowing national authorities to intervene to
block mergers in the "public interest" - an appeal to hardline Tory worries
about ceding any national sovereignty to Brussels.
5. Final
France took the EC Presidency331 in the second half of 1989 and hoped
321. See Dawkins, supra note 318, at 1.
322. Concurrence: Contrble des Fusions, supra note 317, at 10; de Jonquieres & Kellaway, supra
note 317, at 2. Why the smaller countries insisted so strongly on lower thresholds for EC jurisdiction
is unclear. One theory is that the small states sought EC control as a substitute for their own. This
might allow them to turn to the EC for control over concentrations, particularly those accomplished by
companies from larger member states, which the smaller states might not be powerful enough to block
themselves.
323. Lucy Kellaway, EC Fails to Clear Main Obstacles to Common Merger Policy, FIN. TIMES,
Oct. 12, 1989, at 2.
324. Concurrence: Contr~le des Concentrations: A La Recherche D'Un Consensus, EURo-
POLITIQtJ, July 12, 1989, at 3.
325. LA LETrRE EUROPtENNE, Sept. 15, 1989.
326. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
327. David Marsh, Green Light for MBB Takeover By Daimler, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1989, at 22,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Financial Times File.
328. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
329. David Buchan & Richard Lambert, France Proposes EC Mergers Compromise, FIN. TIMES,
Sept. 19, 1989, at 24.
330. William Dawkins, TargetDate SetforAgreeing to Merger Rules, FIN. TIMES, July 18, 1989.
331. The presidency is a rotating position held by each member state for six months. On the
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to rush through a large menu of EC achievements. Agreement on a merger
control regulation, even a flawed one, was one of France's goals.332
Impending German unification provided strong fuel for the EC relaunch. 3"3
As a result, France's negotiators softened their demands on industrial policy
criteria over the objections of the French Ministry of Economics and Finance.
Despite French encouragement, the member states still disagreed sharply
on key issues both within their delegations and among delegations. The
German delegation wavered between the goal of a single clear rule adminis-
tered from Brussels, a position consistent with projecting a cooperative image
of a newly-united Germany, and the pressure of its own Bundeskartellamt to
keep the last word on mergers in the hands of national authorities. The
internal German compromise resulted in the "German Clause, '334 a provi-
sion in the final regulation that left the last word to domestic authorities, but
did so in a way that appeased both the Bundeskartellamt and states worried
about Germany's discretionary use of merger control.335
Great Britain qualified its support for a single clear rule with insistence on
a "public interest derogation." Faced with an impasse on this point, the
delegates drafted a vague provision which came to be known as the "British
Clause '' 33 as a compromise.
Weighing domestic pressure to defend the primacy of "industrial policy"
against its interest in overcoming German and British opposition, France too
had to settle for a vague list of evaluation criteria in the final text, which
could be read as allowing industrial policy and other non-economic criteria to
enter into the evaluation of a merger's legality. 337 Similarly, France had to
compromise its call for reciprocity of treatment between the European
Community and more protectionist non-EC states in order to keep Britain's
support.33' The final text mentions the need to seek "non-discriminatory"
treatment for EC firms in third countries3 9 but is, like the other compromis-
es, ambiguous.
importance of the prestige and pressures of the presidency in EC diplomacy, see Wolfgang Wessels,
The EC Council, in THE NEW EUROPEAN CoMMuNITY: DECISIONMAKING AND INSTITrIONAL CHANGE
133, 147 (Robert 0. Keohane & Stanley Hoffmann eds., 1991).
332. French Coax, supra note 119, at 2.
333. Interview with French official, supra note 285.
334. 1989 Regulation, supra note 3, art. 9; see also infra note 370 and accompanying text.
335. See infra note 370 and accompanying text. Leon Brittan declared that the Commission would
"so control the circumstances" of the Regulation's application that if the Commission made its decisions
wisely, Germany would never have to intervene under the German Clause. David Buchan & Richard
Lambert, EC 'Making Progress' on Merger Control Powers, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1989, available In
LEXIS, Omni Library, Financial Times file.
336. 1989 Regulation, supra note 3, art. 21(3).
337. See infra notes 346-354 and accompanying text.
338. Britain hoped to become an offshore manufacturing plant and investment banking center for
non-EC firms hoping to enter the Community, and thus fought French demands for retaliatory
"reciprocity." The same British-French debate was played out later in the auto-quotas negotiations. See,
e.g., Ethan Schwartz, EC States Open Up To Japan; Protectionist Spirit Weakens in Car Talks, WASH.
POST, Nov. 4, 1990, at Hl.
339. 1989 Regulation, supra note 3, pmbl., art. 24.
Vol. 18:607, 1993
Finally, the poorer southern states received "soft" assurances that their
development needs would be included in the merger control calculus. 3"
In theory, the goal of the new merger regulation was to bind all member
states equally. However, each delegation sought to tailor the Regulation to
leave its own interests unconstrained, while ensuring that others would be
strictly bound. No text could surmount this tension. Therefore, the text that
resulted was stunted on arrival. The threshold for Commission jurisdiction
was raised to five billion ECUs,341 a full twenty-five times higher than the
original 1973 proposal. This threshold will give the Commission authority
over only a fraction of transcontinental mergers. To appease smaller states'
interest in Commission intervention at lower thresholds, a "Dutch Clause"
allows member states to appeal to the Commission even when the combined
EC revenue of the acquiror and target firms is less than five billion
ECUs.342 As these compromises indicate, the member states had managed
to project the appearance of unity despite tenacious commitment to self-
interested policy positions.
VII. REGULATION 89/4064: SUBSTANTIVE AND JURISDICTIONAL
ASPECTS3 43
The Council adopted the final merger control text, Regulation 4064/89, on
December 21, 1989. Sir Leon Brittan lauded the text, declaring that the
"Community as a whole will have, for the first time, a single framework
within which takeovers and mergers of a community dimension can be dealt
with, recognizing the importance of maintaining fair competition throughout
the single market. ""
On close inspection, however, two sets of considerations temper Brittan's
optimism. First, although the substantive criteria for evaluating mergers are
more cleaily based on pure competition considerations than in earlier drafts
of the Regulation,345 the tension between industrial policy and pure competi-
tion continues to exist within the EC.346 Whether the meaning or "impor-
tance of maintaining fair competition" has been agreed upon by all, as Brittan
asserted, is far from clear.
340. Id. pmbl.
341. Id. art. 1.
342. Id. art. 21.
343. For provision by provision analyses of the Regulation, see Bos, supra note 24; DowNEs,
supra note 34; Gerondeau, supra note 245; Hawk, supra note 41; Pappalardo, supra note 37. Bos et
al. analyze the Regulation to determine the extent to which it perpetuates what they perceive as the
"double standard" in EC law, whereby concentrations are treated more favorably than collusion. They
conclude that the Regulation does perpetuate this bias. Bos, supra note 24, at 403-04.
344. Lucy Kellaway, EC Ministers Hand Brussels the Power to Vet Large Mergers, FIN. TIMES,
Dec. 22, 1989, at 2.
345. Bos, supra note 24, at 23.
346. On the continuation of this debate in EC politics and within the Commission, see David
Gardner & Andrew Hill, Delors Reshuffies the European Commission Pack, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Financial Times File.
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More importantly, as the above discussion illustrates, the industrial-policy-
versus-pure-competition debate is itself a rhetorical mask for more basic
divisions hinged on calculations of national self-interest. In this context, the
most important question to be asked about the Regulation is how far it goes
towards establishing a clear, unitary system for controlling mergers in the
European Community. Unfortunately the response is, not very far. The
Regulation sets high hurdles for Commission jurisdiction and fails to clarify
the regulatory landscape which is now comprised of the Regulation itself,
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome, and national competition law.
A. Substantive Evaluation of Mergers: The Industrial-Policy-Versus-Pure-
Competition Debate
Article 2 of the Regulation sets out the substantive criteria for evaluating
a concentration's compatibility with the common market. Paragraph 2 states
that "[a] concentration which does not create or strengthen a dominant position
as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in
the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be declared compatible
with the common market."347 Paragraph 3 declares with similar clarity that
"[a] concentration which creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result
of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common
market or in a substantial part of it shall be declared incompatible with the
common market., 3 4 8
On a first reading, these instructions appear to enshrine "effective
competition" as the sole and absolute criterion by which the Commission must
appraise mergers.3 49 As such, they mark a substantial victory for those states
that advocated a pure competition regime during the negotiations.35 How-
ever, closer inspection reveals ambiguity in the text, particularly regarding
how the absolute imperatives in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 2 relate to
Article 2, paragraph 1. Paragraph 1 instructs the Commission, in determining
whether concentrations are compatible with the common market, to consider
the need to maintain and develop effective competition within the common market in view of,
among other things, the structure of all the markets concerned and the actual or potential
competition from undertakings located either within or without the Community. . .the market
position of the undertakings concerned and their economic and financial power, the
alternatives available to suppliers and users, their access to supplies or markets, any legal or
other barriers to entry, supply and demand trends for the relevant goods and services, the
interests of the intermediate and ultimate consumers, and the development of technical and
347. 1989 Regulation, supra note 3, art. 2(2).
348. Id. art. 2(3).
349. DowNtEs, supra note 34, at 84. On the question of the extent to which Community case law
and Commission practice clarify the concept of "effective competition" compare Bos, supra note 24,
at 206-213 (sound body of Court case law exists under Article 86 establishing well-understood meaning
of effective competition), with Pappalardo, supra note 37, at 23-24 (noting several conflicting
interpretations).
350. See Bos, supra note 24, at 203 (competition analysis remains at heart of competition control,
except in "borderline cases"); STEPHEN WOOLCOCK, Er AL., BRrrA]N, GERMANY AND 1992 at 19
(1991) ("the Germans and British prevailed").
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economic progress provided that it is to consumers' advantage and does not form an obstacle
to competition.
351
This last portion of paragraph 1 echoes the industrial policy goals in Treaty
of Rome Article 85(3) that provide grounds for exempting anti-competitive
actions. Moreover, the preamble to the Regulation, to which civil law courts
as well as the European Court of Justice might turn for interpretive assis-
tance,352 instructs the Commission to appraise concentrations in light of the
"fundamental objectives referred to in Article 2, of the Treaty [of Rome],
including that of strengthening the Community's economic and social
cohesion, referred to in Article 130a. '353 It is unclear how these industrial
policy and social criteria will interact with the absolute stress on competition
in Article 2 paragraphs 2 and 3, and the long list of economic criteria listed
for consideration in paragraph 1.354
B. Regulatory Clarity: A "One-Stop Shop "for Merger Control?
Another important question is the extent to which the Regulation
consolidates authority over industrial concentration in the Commission.355
Again, the response is, not much. The Community is still far from achieving
a single, clear regime to replace the twelve national regimes currently in
place. According to one analysis, "[a]fter September 21 1990 [the date the
Regulation went into effect] there will not be one-stop merger control. Indeed,
it is going to get worse." 356 Significantly, if the ECJ's holding in BAT did
point the way to an expansion of Commission jurisdiction over Community
mergers, the Regulation fails to acknowledge that empowerment. The fact that
the Regulation was unable to achieve a one-stop shop indicates that the
member states have not fully accepted the economic rationalitation arguments
offered to spur the EC relaunch, however much the White Paper, the Cecchini
351. 1989 Regulation, supra note 3, art. 2(1) (emphasis added).
352. GOYDER, supra note 18, at 36.
353. 1989 Regulation, supra note 3, pmbl.
354. Compare Bos, supra note 24, at 17, 22-26, 228-231 and VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note
83, at 324 and HAWK, supra note 41, at 212 ("Read together, these provisions appear to permit the
Commission to consider a wide assortment of competition and noncompetition factors.") with DOWNES,
supra note 34, at 96 ("technical or economic progress are not allowed to operate as an obstacle to
competition,"); see also Woolcock, supra note 286, at 19. The latter is the view of one former British
Office of Fair Trading official who advised on the negotiations. He dismissed the industrial and social
policy language of the Regulation as "so much mumbo jumbo" thrown in to give the French a "fig leaf'
to take back home. Interview with British Official, supra note 285.
355. The seventeen Commissioners may, of course, act as proxies for their home governments.
See, e.g., Peter Ludlow, The European Commission, in THm NEW EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note
15, at 85, 90 (Commissioners as "national champions"). Commission critics point to the Commission
decision regarding Douwe Egberts and Van Nels as a case in which Commissioners followed national
interests. EUR. REP., Nov. 9, 1990, cited in Bos, supra note 24, at 26. In this decision, Dutch
Commissioners convinced the Commission to overrule the recommendation of Director GeneralateIV -
the EC department charged with anti-trust analysis - to veto an acquisition by a Dutch coffee concern.
See Robert Rice, Storm in a Coffee Cup Highlights EC Contest Over Competition, FIN. TIMES, Dec.
10, 1990, at 10.
356. Hawk, supra note 41, at 458.
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report, and the other gospels of 1992 laud them. The member states do not yet
conceive of Europe as a single market which can be administered by a unified
body in Brussels according to neutral economic principles.
1. Jurisdictional Hurdles Within the Regulation
The hurdles to Community jurisdiction are the Regulation's most serious
problem." 7 They are far too high to effect any but a handful of the mergers
and acquisitions that take place in Europe each year. 5 ' The thresholds
represent how little authority the member states were willing to yield to
Brussels: unable to balance their own competing domestic concerns and to
agree among themselves, the states attempted to take back from the Commis-
sion much of what they purported to give it.
To be subject to the Regulation, a concentration must meet two criteria.
First, aggregate worldwide revenue of all the undertakings concerned must be
more than five billion ECUs.359 Second, the aggregate Community-wide
revenue of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned must be more
than 250 million ECUs 60 Concentrations in which each of the undertakings
concerned earns more than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide
revenue within a single member state are excluded from Community
control. 6' It is not clear whether, in the case of concentrations involving
more than two firms, the two-thirds proviso applies to all participants or only
to those with turnover above 250 million ECU. 62
As a result of these provisions, important transactions will escape the
reach of the Regulation. Mergers topping the five billion ECU hurdle will be
mainly conglomerate mergers - mergers linking two firms whose product
lines bear little direct relation to one another. The mergers that are potentially
most harmful to competition, vertical and horizontal mergers, will often fall
beneath the hurdle. 63 In addition, the requirement that each of at least two
firms in the proposed merger yield at least 250 million ECUs of revenue
within the European Community will exclude several controversial forms of
merger. A large foreign firm that does not do much business in the European
Community could buy a very large firm without Commission scrutiny."'
Even large EC firms might be able to buy a number of smaller firms of
appreciable size without topping the thresholds. 65 Finally, the exception for
mergers in which each of the parties concerned generates more than two-thirds
of its revenue in a single state will exclude important deals from the scope of
the Regulation. As one Commission official pointed out, "[e]ven giant firms
357. Pappalardo, supra note 37, at 42.
358. Barry E. Hawk, Europe's Tryfora One-Stop Merger, N.Y. TimES, May 6, 1990, § 3, at 13,
359. 1989 Regulation, supra note 3, art. 1(2)(a).
360. Id. art. 1(2)(b).
361. Id.
362. Dow,_s, supra note 34, at 56.





like Siemens have more than two-thirds of their European turnover in one
member state." 3
One measure of how ineffectual the Regulation's high thresholds are is the
expectation that no more than forty to fifty mergers a year will fall under the
Regulation's purview.367 To put that number in perspective, one should
consider that each year the Bundeskartellamt examines over one thousand
cases.368 Perhaps aware of the Regulation's jurisdictional shortcoming, the
member states undertook to review the thresholds by December 31, 1993 and
to make revisions by qualified majority vote.369
2. Reference to a Member State's Authorities - the "German Clause"
Article 9 contains the first of three derogations from Commission authority
put in the Regulation at the insistence of member states - in this case,
Germany. Under this provision, a member state may demand that the
Commission allow national competition authorities, rather than the Commis-
sion, to consider the proposed concentration under the member state's national
competition law. The Commission may accept or reject such a demand. The
Article allows member states to make such requests if they believe competi-
tion may be impeded within a "distinct market" within their territory.37 It
is intended to allow member states to block mergers that may have anti-
competitive effects in their territory that they fear the Commission may
permit. As such, this clause was made part of the final text in order to assure
German negotiators who, in turn, sought to assure the Bundeskartellamt, that
any EC-imposed regime would be at least as strict as Germany's.
3. Legitimate National Interests - the "British Clause"
Article 21(3) allows member states' merger authorities to control
concentrations under domestic law, rather than under the new Regulation, if
necessary to protect "legitimate interests." Legitimate interests include "public
security, plurality of the media, and prudential rules" for financial institutions.
The list is not exclusive, but the Commission must authorize other rationales
366. Schr6ter Interview, supra note 101.
367. Hawk, supra note 41, at 224; see also DUMEZ & JEUNEMAITRE, supra note 122, at 227
(comparing European Community competition law to guard dog "seemingly awe-inspiring and
independent. The political branch [i.e., the Council] will solemnly put it in place, underscoring its
independence and autonomy. But [the Council's] very logic ... leads it immediately to file down [this
guard dog's] fangs and to chain it. . . to let it bark but not bite ... .
368. Schr~ter Interview, supra note 101.
369. 1989 Regulation, supra note 3, art. 1(3).
370. Id. art. 9(2). The goal is to protect competition in regions, defined in the Regulation as
"geographical reference markets," in which competition in the market for a particular good or service
may be weak, even if competition is strong in neighboring regions or in the Community as a whole.
Article 9, paragraph 7 lists the factors to consider in deciding whether such a "geographical reference
area" exists. These include whether there are unique barriers to product entry in that geographical
region, consumer preferences that may impede competition, or sharp differences in market share
between that region and neighboring ones. Id. art. 9(7).
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for national authorities' assertion of jurisdiction.3 7' One commentator has
noted that "there is considerable uncertainty over which interests may be so
protected and over the precise steps open to a Member State."3" Thus,
social, economic, technological, and regional criteria may enter into merger
policy through this back door. Moreover, unlike the German Clause which
restricts national authorities' actions to measures "strictly necessary" to protect
legitimate interests, the British Clause permits any "appropriate measures."
Article 21(3) is intended for cases in which the Commission approves a
merger but a member state opposes it. Where the Commission rejects a
merger of which a member state approves, the Commission has stated its
belief that the Commission would prevail,3" relying on the ECI's opinion
in Wilhelm & Ors.374
4. Continued Application of Articles 85 and 86375
Another important question that will confront Brussels is whether Articles
85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome, as interpreted in Continental Can and BAT
& RJ Reynolds, continue to apply to mergers both above and below the
thresholds laid out in the new Regulation. The Regulation was adopted under
Articles 87376 and 235 31 of the Treaty of Rome. 37' Therefore, the Regu-
lation was not a Treaty amendment.3 79 Given that the Regulation did not
amend the Treaty, it can be argued that despite the declarations in Article 22
of the Regulation,380 the Regulation does not change whatever powers and
obligations over merger control the Treaty grants to the Commission under
Articles 85 and 86.
On the other hand, the Council might argue that the Regulation endows the
Community with jurisdiction it never had under Continental Can and BAT &
RJ Reynolds. Such an argument would point to the preamble to the new
371. Id. art. 21(3).
372. DowNEs, supra note 34, at 66.
373. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, NINETEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY 267 (1990).
374. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
375. For a general discussion of the continued application of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of
Rome, see Bos, supra note 24, at 395-401; DOWNEs, supra note 34, at 181-90; Pappalardo, supra note
37, at 40-41.
376. Treaty of Rome, supra note 17, art. 87. This Article allows the Council to adopt regulations
to "give effect to the principles set out in Articles 85 and 86.
377. Id. art. 235. This Article, which functions as a sort of "necessary and proper" clause for the
Community, allows the Commission to take appropriate measures that are "necessary to achieve, in the
functioning of the Common Market, one of the aims of the Community in cases where this Treaty has
not provided for the requisite powers of action.. . ." On the use of Article 235 to avoid treaty
amendment and the ensuing expansion of EC jurisdiction, see Weiler, supra note 71, at 2442-53.
378. 1989 Regulation, supra note 3, pmbl.
379. A Treaty amendment would have to have been adopted pursuant to the procedures specified
in Article 236 of the Treaty, a provision that was repealed at Maastricht, but that was in force when
the Council adopted the merger regulation in 1989.
380. Article 22 of the Regulation states that "[tihis Regulation alone shall apply to concentrations
as defined in Article 3." 1989 Regulation, supra note 3, art. 22(1).
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Regulation, which stresses that it was adopted "principally" under Article 235
of the Treaty of Rome,3"' the Treaty's analogue to the necessary and proper
Clause in the United States Constitution. Any provision adopted pursuant to
Article 235 by definition fills a void. The Council therefore could argue that
its reference to Treaty Article 235 in the Regulation's preamble reflects its
assumption that, Continental Can and BAT & RJ Reynolds notwithstanding,
the Community had no jurisdiction over concentrations until 1989. If this
assumption is true, the Regulation creates an entirely new substantive law.
However, the foregoing argument relies on a narrow interpretation of both
Continental Can and BAT & RJ Reynolds. The Regulation's preamble even
acknowledges that "Articles 85 and 86, while applicable, according to the
case-law of the Court of Justice, to certain concentrations, are not however,
sufficient to cover all operations which may prove incompatible with the
system of undistorted competition. "382 Therefore, despite the hypothetical
argument that the Council could raise, Articles 85 and 86 continue to apply
to, nergers and acquisitions. As a result, the Commission might retain
authority under Articles 85 and 86, and in fact could remain obligated to
apply Articles 85 and 86 to concentrations. States and affected individuals
could bring suits under Articles 173 and 175 of the Treaty of Rome to compel
the Commission to act under Articles 85 and 86 if the Commission failed to
do so.3"3
Moreover, whether or not the Regulation preempts the Commission's
authority under Articles 86 and 85 of the Treaty of Rome, Article 86 and
perhaps Article 85 (and their application to mergers under Continental Can
and BAT & RJ Reynolds) may remain enforceable at the national level. The
European Court of Justice has ruled that Article 86 has direct effect; in other
words, Article 86 can be applied by national courts without the passage of any
additional implementing regulation by the Council.384 Thus, unless courts
interpret Regulation Article 22(1) to mean otherwise, national courts remain
obligated to apply Article 86, as understood in Continental Can, to all
concentrations, regardless of whether or not they fall under the scope of the
new Regulation. The continued application of Article 85 is a bit more
complex. In Ministere Public v. Lucas Ases, s' the ECJ ruled that national
courts - as opposed to national competition authorities - may not apply
381. Id. pmbl.
382. Id.
383. Article 173 allows the European Court of Justice to review Commission actions. The Council,
member states, or natural or legal persons to whom decisions have been addressed may have standing
to bring cases to the Court under Article 173. Article 175 allows the Court to review failures to act by
the Commission, where it has an obligation to do so. Individuals may have standing under Article 175
as well, under certain circumstances. For potential Commission obligations to continue applying Articles
85 and 86 to all concentrations, despite Article 22(1) of the merger regulation, see DowNEs, supra note
34, at 187.
384. Case 66/86, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen v. Zentrale zur Bekdmpfung Unlauteren Wettbewerbs,
1989 E.C.R. 803, 848; see also DowNuEs, supra note 34, at 183.
385. Joined Cases 209 to 213/84, 1986 E.C.R. 1425.
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Article 85 if no EC regulation to implement Article 85 has been adopted."8 6
Since Regulation Article 22(2) terminated the application of Regulation 17, no
EC regulation currently implements Treaty Article 85. Therefore, Article 85
no longer has direct effect with regard to concentrations, and individuals may
not bring cases under Article 85 in national courts to block concentrations.
Even after Lucas Asjes, however, national competition authorities retain their
right to act under Article 85, and they may continue to apply that Article to
all concentrations, as decided under BAT & RJ Reynolds.
Of course, another argument can be made to support the proposition that
national authorities should no longer apply Articles 85 and 86 to concentra-
tions. The Council adopted the new Regulation partly under Treaty Article
87,"' which gives the Council the right to "determine the relationship
between national law and the provisions. . . adopted pursuant to this Article."
Regulation Article 22(1) therefore also might be interpreted as a provision
through which, under Article 87, the Council determined that national courts
and authorities should not apply Articles 85 and 86 to concentrations. 388
Whether the Council will adopt this argument remains to be seen.
5. Application of the Regulation Below the Thresholds - the "Dutch
Clause"
Article 22(3)-(6) of the Regulation, the "Dutch Clause," presents the issue
of sending proposed mergersfrom national authorities to the Commission. The
clause allows member states - presumably small ones that either do not have
a competition authority or that are unwilling to challenge larger member states
or multinational corporations on their own - to petition the Commission to
exercise its jurisdiction over concentrations below the Regulation's thresholds.
The Commission may act under the provision if the concentration "affects
trade between member states. "I" The Commission and courts have yet to
decide whether the Commission's authority under the Dutch Clause is the
authority to apply Articles 85 and 86, or to apply the Regulation itself.
6. Evaluation of the "One-Stop Shop"
In sum, then, the Regulation that the Council passed after so many years
of proposals and negotiations has resolved few of the complexities it was
intended to clarify. The Community has not achieved "one-stop" merger
386. The ECI reasoned that since Article 85(3) gives alleged violators the right to seek an
exemption that can appropriately be granted only by a competition authority, not a court, a court can
rule on illegality under Article 85 only if there has been a positive decision of illegality by a competition
authority, or if implementing legislation has given the court such power. Otherwise, such a ruling would
violate the principle of "legal certainty" - the notion that "vested rights" and "legitimate expectations"
may not be removed retroactively. Id. at 1426. On "legal certainty," see HARTLEY, supra note 52, at
139-45.
387. See supra note 376 and accompanying text.
388. See DowNEs, supra note 34, at 185-86.
389. 1989 Regulation, supra note 3, art. 22(3).
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control. "The most serious problem arising out of the interface of Community
law and national law in the field of merger control is that of the potential for
conflict between Community measures applied by the Commission and
national measures applied by the competition authorities in the individual
member states."39 The member states have neither accepted nor rejected
Community authority to administer a common EC policy regarding mergers
and acquisitions. Rather, they have postponed the most critical issues yet
again.
VIn. CONCLUSION
The effort to draft a unified system to control European mergers ended
poorly. Whatever each government's popularly perceived devotion to a
specific economic philosophy and its self-proclaimed dedication to a European
Community relaunch predicated on open markets and common economic
goals, these sentiments were not yet strong enough to overcome the use of
merger control as a nationally-based tool of economic intervention. Supra-
nationalism has yet to replace realpolitik.
Obviously, analysis of one relatively small realm of EC policy-making
cannot gauge the state of the Community's relaunch as a whole. Nonetheless,
antitrust law - as a field in which governments both police and set policy for
the market - may be a particularly good realm in which to take the European
Community's pulse. Following the failure of more overtly supranational
European visions, such as the planned European Defense Community in the
1950s, it was the genius of those EC founders who hoped for a federalist
outcome to frame the construction of Europe within the more palatable context
of a Common Market. Market rhetoric is palatable because it connotes neutral
economic principles while promising economic gain for all. This rhetoric can
therefore be used by domestic elites - such as business leaders - who seek
formation of a common market for their own advantage, 39' as well as by
political leaders who, faced with policy failure at home, must seek internation-
al solutions for domestic problems, and then "sell" these painful compromises
to domestic constituencies. Mitterrand's discovery of Europe following the
failure of his domestic experiment with socialism, and his consequent
realization of the need to reform France's economy, can perhaps be seen in
such a light.
Markets are not neutral - different market structures dictate different sets
of winners and losers. The nation-state, which commands a considerable
degree of loyalty, serves to ease the shock over such losses. At this stage in
Europe's construction, the European Community does not yet command the
popular legitimacy to serve such a purpose. Put bluntly, a Frenchman will
390. DowNEs, supra note 34, at 208.
391. As such, industrial and corporate leaders were the strongest proponents of the "one-stop shop"
for merger control.
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agree to compromise and sacrifice for a French farmer in a way that he will
not for other Europeans.
The unsatisfactory outcome of the merger control debate raises skepticism
about European political leaders' ability to sell supranational solutions for
domestic ailments to their peoples at this stage in European history. The
inability of institutions such as the Commission and the European Court of
Justice to fully advance a supranational solution on merger control and scores
of other issues like it raises questions about their abilities to hurry integration
along in broader realms, such as social policy, monetary union, and foreign
and defense policy. Events of the past two years - the wrangling over
Maastricht, the humiliating ouster of France's socialist government, the
inability of Europe to form any common approach to the Balkan problems -
have raised doubts about the prospects for great progress towards European
union in the near future. The doubts of Euro-skeptics appear to have been
confirmed.
Nonetheless, the economic and political forces that call for greater
European integration continue to exist. If the 1989 Regulation and the process
by which it was adolted are any indication, the next few years for Europe
will be a period of intensified bargaining between the member states and a
period of-muddling through.
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